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Slovenia / Supreme Court / VIII Ips 83/2019

Plaintiff: unnamed former employee; defendant: unnamed former employer
Deciding body type
National Court/Tribunal
Deciding body
Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia
Type
Decision
Decision date
14/01/2020
ECLI (European case law identifier)
ECLI:SI:VSRS:2020:VIII.IPS.83.2019

Handvest van de grondrechten van de Europese Unie

Title IV: Solidarity

Article 31 - Fair and just working conditions

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  • Slovenia / Supreme Court / VIII Ips 83/2019
    Key facts of the case:
    The plaintiff was injured at work and was on sick leave, unfit for work, in the period from December 2013 until June 2017, when they received disability pension and their employment contract was terminated. The plaintiffrequested from their former employer the payment of allowances in lieu of annual leave not taken due to illness for the period between 2014 and the date of termination of their employment contract. According to the Labour Relationships Act (Zakon o delovnih razmerjih, ZDR-1), transposing Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time, paid annual leave may be replaced by an allowance in lieu in case of termination of the employment relationship. The defendant provided for allowances covering the years 2016 and 2017, but rejected the payment of allowances for 2014 and 2015. They claimed that the plaintiff’s entitlement to annual leave for the latter years lapsed, and consequently the plaintiff was not entitled to allowances for holidays they did not consume in the period in question. The plaintiff then filed a lawsuit. The first instance court sided with the plaintiff, and ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff net amount of gross 2.549,47 EUR after deducting taxes and social contributions. The defendant appealed this decision, but the appellate court upheld the judgment issued by the first instance court. The defendant then filed a petition for revision with the Supreme Court. A revision is possible in cases of substantial breach of procedural law in proceedings before the first instance court appealed with the second instance court, substantial breach of procedural law in proceedings before the second instance court, or erroneous application of material law. The Supreme Court allows the revision if the expected decision is related to an important legal issue ensuring legal certainty, the uniform application of the law or the development of law through case law. In this particular case, the Supreme Court decided to review the case and allowed the revision.
     
    Key legal question raised by the Court:
    The Supreme Court allowed a review of the question of whether an employee is entitled to an allowance for annual leave not taken for all years (within the five-year limitation period) before the termination of employment, or upon termination of employment they are only entitled to compensation in lieu of unused annual leave they were entitled to take on the date of termination of employment (as set out in the Labour Relationships Act), but could not due to objective reasons. According to the law, a worker is entitled to use the entire annual leave not used in the current calendar year or by 30 June of the following year due to illness or injury by 31 December of the following year.
     
    Outcome of the case:
    The Supreme Court found that the case at hand did not involve the plaintiff losing the right to an allowance in lieu of annual leave not taken in 2014 and 2015 because they did not apply for it by the end of the reference period (they could not do so, as they were on sick leave at that time), as wrongly established by the second instance court, but because the termination of their labour contract took place more than 15 months after the end of the reference period for carrying over leave entitlement (i.e. more than 18 month after the end of reference period for consuming annual leave in 2015, and more than 30 months as regards the 2014 annual leave). The court noted that in view of the case law of the CJEU, as set out in C-214/2010, the 15-month carry-over period (i.e. period following the reference period; the latter generally being current calendar year) is the period after paid annual leave as a rest period no longer had a positive effect on the worker. In the opinion of the CJEU, the loss of the leave entitlement and consequently the loss of the right to monetary compensation for unused annual leave in case of employment termination after this period were not contrary to Article 7 of Directive 2003/88/EC and Article 31 (2) of the EU Charter.
  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter

    “15. The court of second instance also wrongly refers to the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, as in Sebastian W. Kreuziger v Land Berlin, C-619/16 and Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften eV v Tetsuji Shimizu, C- 684/16, both of 6 November 2018, as the above cases do not relate to a comparable situation. In Case C-619/16, the Court of Justice ruled that Article 7 of Directive 2003/88 / EC must be interpreted as precluding national legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, in so far as it results in that the employee, if he has not applied for the exercise of his right to paid annual leave before the termination of employment, automatically and without prior verification of whether the employer has actually enabled him to exercise this right, in particular by properly instructing him, loses paid annual leave, to which he was entitled at the time of termination of employment under European Union law, and thus the right to an allowance for unused paid annual leave. The decision in Case C-684/16 is similar. Article 7 of Directive 2003/88 / EC and Article 31 (2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union must be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which a worker, if he has not requested to exercise his right to paid annual leave during the relevant reference period, at the end of that period automatically and without prior verification of whether his employer, in particular by having instructed him properly, actually enabled him to exercise that right, loses the paid annual leave acquired for that period , and thus also the right to be paid an allowance for unused annual leave in the event of termination of employment.” “16. However, the present labour dispute does not involve the claimant losing the right to an allowance for unused annual leave for 2014 and 2015 because he did not apply for it at the end of the reference period (the plaintiff could not do so, as he was on sick leave at the time and therefore the employer was not obliged to instruct him specifically on the possibility of taking leave), but because the termination of employment occurred more than 15 months after the end of the period for carrying over annual leave for those years. However, this is the period after which, in accordance with the position of the Court of Justice of the EU in the judgment C-214/2010 cited above, paid annual leave as a rest period no longer has a positive effect on the worker and therefore national law providing for the loss of the right to take annual leave and consequently the loss of the right to an allowance for unused annual leave is not contrary to Article 7 of Directive 2003/88 /EC and Article 31 (2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Consequently, in the present case, the court of second instance was wrong to claim that it was essential for the decision that the applicant had not applied for annual leave.”

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter (original language)

    “15. Sodišče druge stopnje se tudi neutemeljeno sklicuje na sodno prakso Sodišča EU, razvidno iz sodb v zadevah Sebastian W. Kreuziger proti Land Berlin, C-619/16 in Max - Planck - Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften eV proti Tetsujiiju Shimizuju, C-684/16, obe z dne 6. 11. 2018, saj se navedeni zadevi ne nanašata na primerljivo situacijo. V zadevi C-619/16 je sodišče EU razsodilo, da je člen 7. Direktive 2003/88/ES treba razlagati tako, da nasprotuje nacionalni zakonodaji, kot je ta iz postopka o glavni stvari, v delu, v katerem ima za posledico to, da delavec, če za uveljavitev svoje pravice do plačanega letnega dopusta ni zaprosil pred prenehanjem delovnega razmerja, samodejno in brez predhodne preveritve, ali mu je delodajalec zlasti s tem, da ga je ustrezno poučil, dejansko omogočil uveljavitev te pravice, izgubi plačani letni dopust, do katerega je bil ob tem prenehanju delovnega razmerja upravičen na podlagi prava Unije, s tem pa tudi pravico do denarnega nadomestila za neizrabljen plačani letni dopust. Podobna je tudi odločitev v zadevi C-684/16. Člen 7. Direktive 2003/88/ES in člen 31(2) Listine Evropske unije o temeljnih pravicah je treba razlagati tako, da nasprotujeta nacionalni zakonodaji, v skladu s katero delavec, če ni zaprosil za to, da bi lahko v zadevnem referenčnem obdobju uveljavil svojo pravico do plačanega letnega dopusta, ob koncu tega obdobja samodejno in brez predhodne preveritve, ali mu je delodajalec zlasti s tem, da ga je ustrezno poučil, dejansko omogočil uveljavitev te pravice, izgubi plačan letni dopust, ki ga je pridobil za navedeno obdobje, s tem pa tudi pravico, da se mu v primeru prenehanja delovnega razmerja izplača denarno nadomestilo za neizrabljen letni dopust.” “16. V tem delovnem sporu pa ne gre za to, da bi tožnik pravico do denarnega nadomestila za neizrabljen letni dopust za leti 2014 in 2015 izgubil, ker ob koncu referenčnega obdobja ne bi zaprosil za njegovo izrabo (tega tožnik niti ni mogel storiti, saj je bil takrat v bolniškem staležu in ga zato delodajalec tudi ni bil dolžan še posebej poučevati o možnosti izrabe dopusta), temveč zato, ker je do prenehanja delovnega razmerja prišlo več kot 15 mesecev od poteka obdobja za prenos letnega dopusta za navedeni leti. To pa je obdobje, po izteku katerega, v skladu s stališčem sodišča EU v zgoraj citirani sodbi C-214/2010, plačan letni dopust, kot čas za počitek, nima več pozitivnega učinka na delavca in zato nacionalna zakonodaja, ki v takšnem primeru predvideva izgubo pravice do izrabe letnega dopusta in posledično

    tudi izgubo pravice do denarnega nadomestila za neizrabljen letni dopust, ni v nasprotju s členom 7. Direktive 2003/88/ES in členom 31(2) Listine Evropske unije o temeljnih pravicah. Zato se sodišče druge stopnje v tej zadevi neutemeljeno sklicuje na to, da je za odločitev bistveno, da tožnik ni podal prošnje za letni dopust.”