47) In that context, and subject to the assessment as to the applicability of EU law to the case in the main proceedings, it should be observed that a useful answer for the referring court also presupposes the clarification of the scope of the protection afforded by Article 19(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) pursuant to which no one may be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

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63) However, given that, as has been held in paragraph 54 above, the situation of an Icelandic national who arrives at the border of a Member State with a view to entering into its territory and receiving services there is covered by EU law, the provisions of Article 19(2) of the Charter are applicable to such a request from a third State (judgment of 6 September 2016, Petruhhin, C‑182/15, EU:C:2016:630, paragraphs 52 and 53).

64) Therefore, where, in such a situation, the Icelandic national concerned invokes a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment if extradited, the requested Member State must verify, before carrying out that extradition, that the extradition will not prejudice the rights referred to in Article 19(2) of the Charter (judgment of 6 September 2016, Petruhhin, C‑182/15, EU:C:2016:630, paragraph 60).

65) For that purpose, that Member State, in accordance with Article 4 of the Charter, which prohibits inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, cannot restrict itself to taking into consideration solely the declarations of the requesting third State or the accession, by the latter State to international treaties guaranteeing, in principle, respect for fundamental rights. The competent authority of the requested Member State, such as the referring court, must rely, for the purposes of that verification, on information that is objective, reliable, specific and properly updated. That information may be obtained from, inter alia, judgments of international courts, such as judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, judgments of courts of the requesting third State, and also decisions, reports and other documents produced by bodies of the Council of Europe or under the aegis of the United Nations (judgment of 6 September 2016, Petruhhin, C‑182/15, EU:C:2016:630, paragraphs 55 to 59 and the case-law cited).

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68) In the absence of specific facts, including inter alia significant changes in the situation in the requesting third State or indeed substantial and reliable information to demonstrate that the person whose extradition is requested obtained asylum by concealing the fact that he or she was subject to criminal proceedings in his or her country of origin, the existence of a decision of the Icelandic authorities granting that person asylum must thus lead the competent authority of the requested Member State, such as the referring court, to refuse extradition, pursuant to application of Article 19(2) of the Charter.

69) If the authorities of the requested Member State reach the conclusion that Article 19(2) of the Charter does not preclude the execution of that request, it will remain necessary to examine whether the restriction at issue is proportionate to the objective of preventing the risk of impunity for persons who have committed a criminal offence, as recalled in paragraph 60 above. In that regard, it is appropriate to observe that use of the cooperation and mutual assistance mechanisms provided for in the criminal field under EU law is, in any event, an alternative means, which is less prejudicial to the exercise of the right to freedom of movement than extradition to a third State with which the European Union has not concluded an extradition agreement, which also allows that objective to be effectively achieved (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 September 2016, Petruhhin, C‑182/15, EU:C:2016:630, paragraphs 47 and 49).

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77) Having regard to all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the questions referred is that EU law, in particular Article 36 of the EEA Agreement and Article 19(2) of the Charter, must be interpreted as meaning that, when a Member State, to which a national of an EFTA State — which is a party to the EEA Agreement and with which the European Union has concluded a surrender agreement — has moved, receives an extradition request from a third State pursuant to the European Convention on Extradition, and when that national was granted asylum by that EFTA State — before he or she acquired the nationality of that State — precisely on account of the criminal proceedings brought against him or her in the State which issued the request for extradition, it is for the competent authority of the requested Member State to verify that the extradition would not infringe the rights covered by Article 19(2) of the Charter, the grant of asylum being a particularly substantial piece of evidence in the context of that verification. Before considering executing the request for extradition, the requested Member State is obliged, in any event, to inform that same EFTA State and, should that State so request, surrender that national to it, in accordance with the provisions of the surrender agreement, provided that that State has jurisdiction, pursuant to its national law, to prosecute that person for offences committed outside its national territory.

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78) Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the national court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.

On those grounds, the Court (Grand Chamber) hereby rules:

EU law, in particular Article 36 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area of 2 May 1992 and Article 19(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as meaning that, when a Member State, to which a national of a Member State of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) — which is a party to the Agreement on the European Economic Area and with which the European Union has concluded a surrender agreement — has moved, receives an extradition request from a third State pursuant to the European Convention on Extradition, signed at Paris on 13 December 1957, and when that national was granted asylum by that EFTA State — before he or she acquired the nationality of that State — precisely on account of the criminal proceedings brought against him or her in the State which issued the request for extradition, it is for the competent authority of the requested Member State to verify that the extradition would not infringe the rights covered by Article 19(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the grant of asylum being a particularly substantial piece of evidence in the context of that verification. Before considering executing the request for extradition, the requested Member State is obliged, in any event, to inform that same EFTA State and, should that State so request, surrender that national to it, in accordance with the provisions of the surrender agreement, provided that that EFTA State has jurisdiction, pursuant to its national law, to prosecute that national for offences committed outside its national territory.