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Slovenia / Administrative Court of the Republic of Slovenia / Decision I U 233/2024-6 / ECLI:SI:UPRS:2024:I.U.233.2024.6
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Slovenia / Administrative Court of the Republic of Slovenia / Decision I U 233/2024-6 / ECLI:SI:UPRS:2024:I.U.233.2024.6
Key facts of the case :
The plaintiff is a Syrian national whose subsidiary protection status was not extended on the ground of exclusion clause. In return decision served to the plaintiff, the police set the deadline for their voluntary departure. The foreign national approached the Ljubljana Police Administration and applied for permission to stay (dovolitev zadrževanja), a permission issued to a foreigner who must be removed to remain temporarily in the Republic of Slovenia. The authorities dismissed the application as inadmissible. They claimed that the procedure for granting permission to stay is initiated ex officio by the police after the conditions for the removal of a foreigner laid down in the Foreigners Act (Zakon o tujcih) are met (Article 69). In particular, the deadline for voluntary departure of the foreigner (Article 66) had not expired, so the foreigner was not formally in the removal proceedings yet and thus could not be a party to the procedure in question. The plaintiff approached the Administrative Court asserting, amongst others, that such an interpretation was not lawful, and that the procedural prerequisite (Article 73) was only that the applicant is in the removal proceedings, regardless of whether the period for their voluntary departure has already expired or not. They also asked for priority consideration, relating that permission to stay is a basis for other existentially important entitlements (i.e. basic subsistence allowance).
Key legal question raised by the Court:
The court considered the admissibility of an application for permission to stay in the period preceding the expiry of the deadline for voluntary departure from the country by a foreigner residing in the country in irregular manner.
Outcome of the case:
The Administrative court clarified the broader context of the matter at hand. Amongst others, it found that the plaintiff was correct in claiming that the reasoning behind the police decision was not lawful, although not entirely for the reasons stated by the plaintiff themselves. According to the court, not only that the plaintiff was within their rights when requesting the issuance of a decision on the permission to stay before the expiration of the period for voluntary removal, but the administrative authority should not have issued a return decision to a foreigner in the first place if removal to the country of origin is not possible, because there are serious and well-founded reasons to believe that the foreigner, in the event of return, would face a real risk of treatment in violation of the right enshrined in Article 19(2) of the Charter.
The Court further found that the present case concerns the implementation of EU law within the meaning of the first sentence of Article 51(1) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, namely that it is governed by provisions of the EU Return Directive relating to the principle of non-refoulement, legal remedies available and safeguards pending return, respectively, all in conjunction with Recital no. 12, which states that the situation of third-country nationals residing in irregular manner, but whose removal is not yet possible, must be addressed and that the basic conditions of their subsistence must be determined in national legislation. In Slovenia, the latter is transposed through the Foreigners Act guaranteeing the right to payment of financial assistance in the amount and in the manner specified for the payment of financial social assistance by the law regulating social security benefits.
The court also highlighted that the Qualification Directive did not contain a provision regarding exclusion from subsidiary protection status that would be identical to the relevant provision of Article 14(6) of the Qualification Directive, which refers to exclusion from refugee status. To protect the right to human dignity under Article 1 of the Charter, it is thus necessary to consistently and effectively implement the provisions safeguarding minimum social rights of a foreigner whose subsidiary protection was not extended due to the exclusion clause, as set out in the Return Directive 2008/115 or the Foreigners Act. The Court thus noted that since the plaintiff’s subsidiary protection was not extended, and removal was not possible, namely it was not permissible to issue them a return decision due to the non-refoulement principle under Article 19(2) of the Charter, they were entitled to specific entitlements ensuring basic subsistence in accordance with Article 1 of the Charter. According to the court, the plaintiff is thus entitled to request the issuance of a decision on permission to stay, even if the period for voluntary departure has not expired.
The Administrative Court was aware that its legal interpretation clashed with the interpretation of the Supreme Court in an earlier case, since the Supreme Court’s interpretation aligns with the interpretation of the relevant legal provisions by the Ljubljana Police Administration in the contested act and the position of the State Attorney's Office which represented the defendant. The Administrative Court, however, found that the Supreme Court did not apply EU law in that case although it indeed concerned the application of EU law. In addition, due to the established principle of primacy of EU law over national law, the Administrative Court could not follow the interpretation of the law by the Supreme Court.
The Administrative Court thus sided with the plaintiff. It annulled the decision by the defendant and instructed them to follow the court’s interpretation of procedural and substantive law in new proceedings.
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Paragraphs referring to EU Charter
20. The plaintiff is correct in asserting that such reasoning for the decision is unlawful, although not entirely for the reasons stated by the plaintiff but rather based on a different methodology for interpreting the law. The issue is not merely that the plaintiff may request the issuance of a decision on the permission to stay before the expiration of the period for voluntary removal. What is also important in the whole case is that the administrative authority may not issue a return decision to a foreigner at all if removal to the country of origin is not possible, because there are serious and well-founded reasons to believe that the foreigner, in the event of return, would face a real risk of treatment in violation of the right enshrined in Article 19(2) of the Charter. (1)
21. The present case concerns the implementation of EU law within the meaning of the first sentence of Article 51(1) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (hereinafter: the Charter) in conjunction with the EU Return Directive 2008/115/EC, which is also mentioned by the State Attorney's Office in its response to the claim, where the State Attorney's Office supports the arguments of the Ljubljana Police Administration. The present case concerns the implementation of the provisions of the second subparagraph of Article 5 of the Return Directive 2008/115, (2) the first paragraph of Article 13 of the Return Directive 2008/115, which regulates legal remedies against a "return decision", the provision of Article 14 of the Return Directive 2008/115, which regulates safeguards pending return, all in conjunction with recital no. 12, which states that the situation of third-country nationals residing illegally, but whose removal is not yet possible, must be addressed and that the basic conditions of their subsistence must be determined in national legislation. The latter is regulated in the provision of the third paragraph of Article 75 of the ZTuj-2,* to which the plaintiff also refers in the lawsuit. According to this provision, the right to basic care from the first paragraph of this article is the right to payment of financial assistance in the amount and in the manner specified for the payment of financial social assistance by the law regulating social security benefits. The right to basic care is ensured by the office of the Government of the Republic of Slovenia responsible for the care of migrants.”
24. Although the Geneva Convention does not regulate subsidiary protection, the granting of subsidiary protection should arguably not be seen as a constitutive act but rather as a declaratory one, (9) and this may indicate the necessary distinction between the "status" and the "condition" of subsidiary protection. Since the Qualification Directive 2011/95/EU does not contain a provision regarding exclusion from subsidiary protection status that would be identical to the provision of Article 14(6) of the Qualification Directive 2011/95/EU, which refers to exclusion from refugee status, it is necessary, in order to protect the right to human dignity under Article 1 of the Charter, to consistently and effectively implement the provisions safeguarding minimum social rights under the Return Directive 2008/115 or the ZTuj-2 of a foreigner whose subsidiary protection was not extended due to the exclusion clause. Apart from this, it is probably not insignificant that the Court of Justice of the EU in the case of H.T. adopted (evolutionary, dynamic) interpretation that recitals 8, 9 and 39 of the Qualification Directive 2011/95/EU state that the Union legislature, in response to the call of the Stockholm Programme, wished to establish a uniform status for all persons eligible for international protection and therefore decided to grant beneficiaries of subsidiary protection the same rights and benefits as beneficiaries of refugee status, subject to derogations which are strictly necessary and objectively justified. It should also be noted that the Union legislature, in defining the grounds for loss of subsidiary protection status, was guided by the rules applicable to refugees. The wording and structure of Article 19 of Directive 2011/95/EU, which concerns loss of subsidiary protection status, are similar to Article 14 of the said directive, which concerns loss of refugee status, which itself is guided by Article 1(C) of the Geneva Convention. (10)
27. For the dispute at hand, it is also important that the Court of Justice of the EU, in the context of protecting the right to prohibition of inhuman treatment (non-refoulement) under Article 5 of Directive 2008/115, does not distinguish between a legal remedy against a return decision and a legal remedy against a removal decision. The principle of non-refoulement is safeguarded already at the stage of issuing a return decision and not only against a decision or act of removal, (13) whereby the legal remedy under Article 13(1) of the Return Directive, in conjunction with the right under Article 47 of the Charter, has direct effect. (14) A return decision must also specify the country to which the foreigner is to be removed, (15) because "the principle of non-refoulement must be respected at all stages of the return procedure", including when the authority intends to adopt a return decision. (16)
28. Therefore, Article 5 of Directive 2008/115 precludes issuing a return decision against a third-country national if that decision designates a destination country where there are serious and well-founded reasons to believe, if that decision were to be enforced, the individual would be exposed to a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 19(2) of the Charter. (17) The provision of Article 5 of Directive 2008/115, which governs the principle of non-refoulement, has direct effect. (18) The prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment is absolute, since it is closely linked to the respect for human dignity laid down in that article. (19) In doing so, the Court of Justice of the EU has also relied extensively on the comparable case law of the European Court of Human Rights. (20)
30. Since the claimant’s subsidiary protection was not extended but removal is not possible, namely it is not permissible to issue them a return decision due to the non-refoulement principle under Article 19(2) of the Charter, they are entitled to specific entitlements ensuring basic subsistence in accordance with Article 1 of the Charter, (23) and this means the claimant is entitled to request the issuance of a decision on permission to stay, even if the period for voluntary departure has not expired. (24)
31. The Administrative Court is aware of a different interpretation of the provisions of the ZTuj-2, namely from the revision judgment of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia in the case X Ips 69/2021 of 26 January 2022, which aligns with the interpretation of the relevant legal provisions by the Ljubljana Police Administration in the contested act and the position of the State Attorney's Office in the response to the lawsuit. However, in this judgment, the Supreme Court of RS did not take into account the judgment of the Court of Justice of the EU in the LM case, which was issued approximately 4 months before the judgment of the Supreme Court of RS, and all other judgments of the Court of Justice of the EU that support the assessment of the Administrative Court in this case. Namely, the Supreme Court of RS did not take into account and did not proceed from the fact that the case in question concerns the implementation of EU law in connection with the provisions of EU Directive 2008/115/EC (Articles 4(a) and (b), 9(2) and recitals 12 and 14) and the provision of Article 1 of the Charter, laying down the right to human dignity (25), including in relation to certain minimum conditions for a life in dignity. In the case X Ips 69/2021, the Supreme Court of RS proceeded solely from the linguistic interpretation of ZTuj-2, (26) historical amendments to the law, (27) the “logic of the enforcement procedure” and the meaningful interpretation of the law, (28) as well as the legal theory of administrative procedural law, (29) but without applying EU law. (30) Therefore, the court may not accept the argument of the State Attorney's Office, which refers to the judgment of the Administrative Court in the case II U 387/2020 of 7 June 2023, since the Administrative Court in the said case relied only on the Supreme Court's revision judgment in the case X Ips 69/2021.
32. According to the provision of the third paragraph of Article 3.a of the Constitution, legal acts and decisions adopted within the framework of the EU to which Slovenia transfers the exercise of part of its sovereign rights shall be applied in Slovenia in accordance with the legal order of the EU. According to the interpretation of the Court of Justice of the EU, a regulation or administrative or judicial practice that is not in accordance with secondary EU law and Article 47 of the Charter, even if it stems from the case law of the supreme administrative court, must be repealed in such a way that all administrative courts of the Member State concerned, including the supreme administrative court, exclude that case law that is not in accordance with Union law. (31) Due to this established principle of the application of EU law, the Administrative Court could not follow the interpretation of the provisions of ZTuj-2 of the Supreme Court from the judgment in the case X Ips 69/2021.
33. On this basis, the court granted the claim (point 4, consequently point 3 and point 2 of the first paragraph of Article 64 of the ZUS-1**) and annulled the contested act and ordered the defendant to act as follows from the first and second points of the operative part of this judgment (fourth and fifth paragraph of Article 64 of the ZUS-1). The court decided without a main hearing or without an oral hearing of the plaintiff within the meaning of Article 47 of the Charter, which has direct effect. (32) Since the plaintiff did not propose a main hearing or giving evidence through an oral hearing, the court must decide in such cases within 8 days (seventh paragraph of Article 73 of the ZTuj-2), as the plaintiff also proposed a priority hearing of the case. Apart from this, according to the interpretation of Article 47 of the Charter, which corresponds to Article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, (33) an oral hearing was not necessary in the specific case. (34) Furthermore, the facts of the case were not contentious between the parties (first paragraph of Article 59 of the ZUS-1).
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Paragraphs referring to EU Charter (original language)
20. Tožnik ima prav, da je takšna obrazložitev akta nezakonita, vendar iz ne povsem istih razlogov oziroma točneje na podlagi drugačne metodologije razlage prava, kot jo je navedel tožnik. Ne gre namreč zgolj za to, da tožnik lahko predlaga izdajo odločbe o dovolitvi zadrževanja pred iztekom roka za prostovoljno odstranitev, ampak je v celotni zadevi pomembno tudi to, da upravni organ sploh ne sme izdati odločbe o vrnitvi tujcu, če odstranitev v državo izvora ni možna, ker obstajajo resni in utemeljeni razlogi za prepričanje, da bi bil tujec v primeru vrnitve izpostavljen resnični nevarnosti ravnanja v nasprotju s pravico iz člena 19(2) Listine. (1)
21. V predmetni zadevi gre namreč za izvajanje prava EU v smislu prvega stavka člena 51(1) Listine EU o temeljnih pravicah (v nadaljevanju: Listina) v zvezi z Direktivo EU o vračanju 2008/115/ES, ki jo omenja tudi Državno odvetništvo v odgovoru na tožbo, v katerem Državno odvetništvo sicer podpira argumentacijo Policijske uprave Ljubljana. V predmetnia zdevi se izvajajo določbe drugega pododstavka člena 5 Direktive o vračanju 2008/115, (2) prvega odstavka 13. člena Direktive o vračanju 2008/115, ki ureja pravna sredstva zoper "odločbo v zvezi z vrnitvijo", določilo 14. člena Direktive o vračanju 2008/115, ki ureja varovalne ukrepe pred vrnitvijo, vse v povezavi z uvodno izjavo št. 12, ki pravi, da je treba obravnavati položaj državljanov tretjih držav, ki prebivajo nezakonito, a njihova odstranitev še ni mogoča in da je osnovne pogoje za njihovo bivanje treba določiti v nacionalni zakonodaji. Slednje je urejeno v določbi tretjega odstavka 75. člena ZTuj-2, na katero se sklicuje tudi tožnik v tožbi. Po tej določbi je pravica do osnovne oskrbe iz prvega odstavka tega člena pravica do izplačila denarne pomoči v višini in na način, kot ga za izplačilo denarne socialne pomoči določa zakon, ki ureja socialno varstvene prejemke. Pravico do osnovne oskrbe zagotavlja urad Vlade Republike Slovenije, pristojen za oskrbo migrantov."
24. Ženevska konvencija sicer ne ureja subsidiarne zaščite, vendar pa tudi na podelitev subsidiarne zaščite najbrž ne gre gledati kot na konstitutivni akt, ampak prej na deklaratorni akt, (9) in da to lahko kaže na potrebno razlikovanje med "statusom" in "stanjem" subsidiarne zaščite. Ker Kvalifikacijska direktiva 2011/95/EU v primeru izključitve iz statusa subsidiarne zaščite nima določbe, ki bi bila identična z določilom člena 14(6) Kvalifikacijske direktive 2011/95/EU, ki se nanaša na izključitev iz statusa begunca, je zaradi varstva pravice do človekovega dostojanstva iz 1. člena Listine potrebno, da se dosledno in učinkovito uresničujejo določbe o varstvu minimalnih socialnih pravic na podlagi Direktive o vračanju 2008/115 oziroma ZTuj-2 tujca, ki mu ni bila podaljšana subsidiarna zaščita zaradi izključitvene klavzule. Ob tem verjetno ni brez pomena dejstvo, da je Sodišče EU v zadevi H.T. izpeljalo (evolutivno, dinamično) interpretacijo, da je v uvodnih izjavah 8, 9 in 39 Kvalifikacijske direktive 2011/95/EU navedeno, da je želel zakonodajalec Unije kot odziv na poziv Stockholmskega programa vzpostaviti enoten status vseh oseb, upravičenih do mednarodne zaščite, in se je zato odločil upravičencem do statusa subsidiarne zaščite priznati enake pravice in ugodnosti, kot jih imajo upravičenci do statusa begunca, razen odstopanj, ki so nujno potrebna in objektivno upravičena. Poleg tega je treba opozoriti, da se je zakonodajalec Unije pri opredelitvi razlogov za izgubo statusa subsidiarne zaščite zgledoval po pravilih, ki se uporabljajo za begunce. Besedilo in struktura člena 19 Direktive 2011/95/EU, ki se nanaša na izgubo statusa subsidiarne zaščite, sta namreč podobna členu 14 navedene direktive, ki se nanaša na izgubo statusa begunca, ki pa se sam zgleduje po členu 1(C) Ženevske konvencije. (10)
27. Za obravnavani spor je pomembno tudi, da Sodišče EU v kontekstu varovanja pravice do prepovedi nečloveškega ravnanja (non-refoulement) iz 5. člena Direktive 2008/115 ne razlikuje med pravnim sredstvom zoper odločbo o vrnitvi in pravnim sredstvom zoper odločbo o odstranitvi. Načelo nevračanja se namreč varuje že v postopku izdaje odločbe o vrnitvi in ne šele ali zgolj zoper odločbo ali akt odstranitve, (13) pri čemer ima pravno sredstvo iz člena 13(1) Direktive o vračanju v zvezi s pravico iz 47. člena Listine direktni učinek. (14) V odločbi o vrnitvi mora biti obvezno navedena tudi država, v katero je treba tujca odstraniti, (15) ker je "treba v vseh fazah postopka vračanja spoštovati načelo nevračanja", torej tudi že, ko organ namerava sprejeti odločbo o vrnitvi. (16)
28. Zato člen 5 Direktive 2008/115 nasprotuje temu, da se zoper državljana tretje države izda odločba o vrnitvi, če ta odločba kot namembno državo predvideva državo, v kateri obstajajo resni in utemeljeni razlogi za prepričanje, da bi bil v primeru izvršitve navedene odločbe ta državljan izpostavljen resnični nevarnosti ravnanja, ki je v nasprotju s členom 19(2) Listine. (17) Določba 5. člena Direktive 2008/115, ki ureja načelo nevračanja, ima neposredni učinek. (18) Prepoved nečloveškega ali ponižujočega ravnanja je absolutna, ker je tesno povezana s spoštovanjem človekovega dostojanstva iz člena. (19) Ob tem se je Sodišče EU obširno oprlo tudi na primerljivo prakso Evropskega sodišča za človekove pravice. (20)
30. Ker torej tožniku na podlagi dejstva, da mu subsidiarna zaščita ni bila podaljšanja, ni pa ga mogoče odstraniti iz države oziroma če mu ni dopustno izdati odločbe o vrnitvi zaradi načela nevračanja iz člena 19(2) Listine, mu pripadajo določena upravičenja zaradi zagotovitve osnovnih pogojev za bivanje v skladu z določbo 1. člena Listine, (23) to pomeni, da je tožnik upravičen zahtevati izdajo odločbe o dovolitvi zadrževanja, četudi mu rok za prostovoljni odhod še ni potekel. (24)
31. Upravnemu sodišču je sicer poznana drugačna interpretacija določb ZTuj-2 in sicer iz revizijske sodbe Vrhovnega sodišča RS v zadevi X Ips 69/2021 z dne 26. 1. 2022, ki se ujema z razlago predmetnih zakonskih določb s strani Policijske uprave Ljubljana v izpodbijanem aktu in stališčem Državnega odvetništva v odgovoru na tožbo. Vendar pa Vrhovno sodišče RS v tej sodbi ni upoštevalo sodbe Sodišča EU v zadevi LM, ki je bila izdana približno 4 mesece pred sodbo Vrhovnega sodišča RS ter vseh ostalih sodb Sodišča EU, ki podpirajo presojo Upravnega sodišča v tej zadevi. Vrhovno sodišče RS namreč ni upoštevalo oziroma ni izhajalo iz tega, da gre v predmetni zadevi za izvajanje prava EU v povezavi z določbami Direktive EU 2008/115/ES (členi 4(a) in (b), 9(2) in 14 ter uvodni izjavi št. 12 in 24) in določilom 1. člena Listine, ki opredeljuje pravico do človekovega dostojanstva (25) tudi v zvezi s določenimi minimalnimi pogoji za človeka dostojno življenje. Vrhovno sodišče RS je v zadevi X Ips 69/2021 izhajalo zgolj iz jezikovne razlage ZTuj-2, (26) zgodovinske razlage spreminjanja zakona, (27) "logike izvršilnega postopka" in smiselne razlage zakona, (28) ter pravne teorije o upravno-procesnem pravu (29) in ni uporabilo prava EU. (30) Zato sodišče tudi argumenta Državnega odvetništva, ki se sklicuje na sodbo Upravnega sodišča v zadevi II U 387/2020 z dne 7. 6. 2023, ne sme sprejeti, saj se je upravno sodišče v omenjeni zadevi oprlo samo na revizijsko sodbo Vrhovnega sodišča v zadevi X Ips 69/2021.
32. Po določbi tretjega odstavka člena 3.a Ustave se pravni akti in odločitve, sprejeti v okviru EU na katere Slovenija prenese izvrševanje dela suverenih pravic, v Sloveniji uporabljajo v skladu s pravno ureditvijo EU. Po interpretaciji Sodišča EU je treba ureditev oziroma upravno ali sodno prakso, ki ni v skladu z sekundarnim pravom EU in 47. členom Listine, tudi če le-ta izhaja iz sodne prakse vrhovnega upravnega sodišča, odpraviti tako, da vsa upravna sodišča zadevne države članice, vključno z vrhovnim upravnim sodiščem, to sodno prakso, ki ni v skladu s pravom Unije, izključijo. (31) Zaradi tega ustaljenega načela uporabe prava EU Upravno sodišče ni moglo slediti interpretaciji določb ZTuj-2 Vrhovnega sodišča iz sodbe v zadevi X Ips 69/2021.
33. Na tej podlagi je sodišče tožbi ugodilo (4. točka, posledično 3. točka in 2. točka prvega odstavka 64. člena ZUS-1) in izpodbijani akt odpravilo in toženi stranki naložilo ravnanja, kot to izhaja iz prve in druge točke izreka te sodbe (četrti in peti odstavek 64. člena ZUS-1). Sodišče je odločilo brez glavne obravnave oziroma brez ustnega zaslišanja tožnika v smislu 47. člena Listine, ki ima neposredni učinek. (32) Kajti tožnik glavne obravnave ali dokaza z ustnim zaslišanjem ni predlagal, sodišče mora v tovrstnih zadevah odločiti v roku 8 dni (sedmi odstavek 73. člena ZTuj-2), tožnik je tudi predlagal prednostno obravnavo zadeve. Poleg tega po razlagi 47. člena Listine, ki ustreza 6. členu Konvencije o varstvu človekovih pravic in temeljnih svoboščin, (33) ustno zaslišanje v konkretnem primeru ni bilo potrebno; (34) nadalje tudi dejstva med strankama niso bila sporna (prvi odstavek 59. člena ZUS-1).