The court stated that the Law [Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data] implements Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (hereinafter – Directive 95/46). Article 1 (4) of the Law implements the second indent of Article 3 (2) of Directive 95/46, which provides for exceptions to the application of Directive 95/46 in cases where personal data are processed by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity, therefore for the interpretation of this provision of the Law it is important to take into account the interpretation of the provisions of Directive 95/46 by the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter – the CJEU). In the judgment of 11 December 2014 in the case Ryneš (C-212/13, ECLI: EU: C: 2014: 2428), the CJEU examined the question whether the situation, when camera system installed on a family home for the purposes of the protection of the property, health and life of the owners of the home, but such a system also monitors a public space falls within the exception set out in the second indent of Article 3 (2) of Directive 95/46. The CJEU stated that operation of a camera system, which also monitors a public space, does not amount to the processing of data in the course of a purely personal or household activity, for the purposes of that provision of the second indent of Article 3 (2) of Directive 95/46, therefore, the provisions of Directive 95/46 shall be applicable for such situations. In the judgment the CJEU noted that the image of a person recorded by a camera constitutes personal data within the meaning of Directive 95/46 inasmuch as it makes it possible to identify the person concerned; video surveillance falls, in principle, within the scope of Directive 95/46 in so far as it constitutes automatic processing; surveillance in the form of a video recording of persons, which is stored on a continuous recording device constitutes the automatic processing of personal data (recitals 15 and 16 of Directive 95/46, paragraphs 22, 24-25 of the judgment). While examining the questions, whether such processing should nevertheless, in circumstances such as those of the case before it, be considered as carried out ‘in the course of a purely personal or household activity“, the CJEU noted that, according to settled case-law, the protection of the fundamental right to private life guaranteed under Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union ( hereinafter - the Charter) requires that derogations and limitations in relation to the protection of personal data must apply only in so far as is strictly necessary (paragraph 28 of the judgment and referred case-law of the CJEU). The CJEU stated that the provisions of Directive 95/46, in so far as they govern the processing of personal data liable to infringe fundamental freedoms, in particular the right to privacy, must necessarily be interpreted in the light of the fundamental rights set out in the Charter and the exception provided for in the second indent of Article 3(2) of Directive 95/46 must be narrowly construed (paragraph 29 of the judgment and referred case-law of the CJEU). In the assessment of the CJEU narrow interpretation of the exception has its basis also in the very wording of that provision of Directive 95/46, under which the directive does not cover the processing of data where the activity in the course of which that processing is carried out is a ‘purely’ personal or household activity, that is to say, not simply a personal or household activity, therefore, the processing of personal data comes within the exception only where it is carried out in the purely personal or household setting of the person processing the data; to the extent that video surveillance covers a public space and is accordingly directed outwards from the private setting of the person processing the data in that manner, it cannot be regarded as an activity which is a purely ‘personal or household’ activity (paragraphs 30-31, 33 of the judgment). CJEU in the judgment also noted that the provisions of Directive 95/46 (Articles 7(f), 11(2), and 13(1)(d) and (g)) makes it possible, to take into account legitimate interests pursued by the controller, such as the protection of the property, health and life of his family and himself (paragraph 34 of the judgment). Therefore, in this judgment the CJEU stated that the operation of a camera system, as a result of which a video recording of people is stored on a continuous recording device according to the provisions of the Directive 95/46 constitutes the processing of personal data, and, when such system even partly monitors a public space, it does not fall within the exception established by the second indent of Article 3 (2) of Directive 95/46, however according to the provisions of Directive 95/46 legitimate interests pursued by the controller could be taken into account. The Supreme Court of Lithuania (hereinafter - the LAT) followed the above interpretations of the CJEU in the judgment of 26 June 2015 in the civil case no. 3K-3-430-415/2015, which addressed the issue of the application of the exception provided for in Article 1 (4) of the Law, when the camera system monitors not only the part of the household owned by the filming person, but also part of the commonly used land plot, courtyard, persons living in the house, and outsiders coming to the house. In the mentioned case, the LAT stated that in such a case there is a ground for the application of the Law, implementing provisions of Directive 95/46 and the exception provided for in Article 1 (4) of the Law is not applicable