63) However, it is settled case-law that an error made in designating the text applicable cannot lead to the inadmissibility of the complaint put forward, since the purpose and the summary of that complaint appear sufficiently clearly from the application (Case 12/68 X. v Audit Board of the European Communities [1969] ECR 109, paragraph 7; Case T-171/99 Corus UK v Commission [2001] ECR II-2967, paragraph 36; and the judgment of 13 November 2008 in Case T-128/05 SPM v Council and Commission, not published in the ECR, paragraph 65). Nor, therefore, is an applicant obliged expressly to state on which particular rule of law his complaint is based, provided that his line of argument is sufficiently clear for the opposing party and the Community Courts to be able to identify the rule without difficulty (SPM v Council and Commission, paragraph 65; see also, to that effect, Case T-279/03 Galileo International Technology and Others v Commission [2006] ECR II-1291, paragraph 47). Consequently, and despite the incorrect reference to a provision of French law, the plea referred to in paragraph 60 above must be understood as meaning that the applicants sought to claim that, in the light of its stereotypical nature, the contested decision disregarded the obligation to state reasons for judicial measures of the European Union laid down by Article 296 TFEU and by Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (OJ 2010 C 83, p. 389). That interpretation of the application was set out, moreover, on their behalf, during the hearing, by the lawyer for the applicants.

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65) Under Article 41(2)(c) of the Charter, the right to good administration includes, inter alia, ‘the obligation of the administration to give reasons for its decisions.’

66) It has consistently been held that the statement of reasons required by Article 296 TFEU and Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights must be appropriate to the measure at issue and to the context in which it was adopted. It must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in question in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the competent court to exercise its power of review of the lawfulness thereof. The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case (see Case T-228/02 Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council [2006] ECR II-4665, paragraph 141 and the case-law cited).

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67) It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons for a measure satisfies the requirements of Article 296 TFEU and Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question. In particular, the reasons given for a measure adversely affecting a person are sufficient if that measure was adopted in a context which was known to that person and which enables him to understand the scope of the measure concerning him. Moreover, the degree of precision of the statement of the reasons for a decision must be weighed against practical realities and the time and technical facilities available for making the decision (see Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v Council, paragraph 66 above, paragraph 141 and the case-law cited).

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72) It follows from this that the contested decision contains the statement of the points of law and facts which, according to the Council, constitute the basis for its decision. In other words, the wording of that decision discloses in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the Council. Consequently, the contested decision fully satisfies the requirements laid down by Article 296 TFEU and Article 41 of the Charter.

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74) By the third plea, the applicants claim that the contested decision disregards Article 17(1) of the Charter.

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75) Article 17(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights guarantees the right to property. It is not, however, absolute (see, to that effect, Case 4/73 Nold v Commission [1974] ECR 491, paragraph 14, and Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission [2008] ECR I-6351, paragraph 355) and may, consequently, be subject to restrictions.

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77) Article 52(1) of the Charter on Fundamental Rights provides, first, that ‘[an]y limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by [the Charter on Fundamental Rights] must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms’, and, second, that ‘[s]ubject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the [European] Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.’

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96) It follows from this that the contested decision applied a criterion other than that laid down in Article 1(1) of Decision 2011/72 when it included the first applicant among the persons whose assets were required to be frozen pursuant to Decision 2011/72. In so doing, it infringed the provision which it was intended to implement, so that the limitation on the exercise of the first applicant’s right to property, which that decision entails, cannot be regarded as being provided for by law for the purposes of Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.