1) This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of (i) Article 4(7) and Article 15 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ 2016 L 119, p. 1), and (ii) Article 267 TFEU, read together with the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’).

...

26) However, that court is uncertain, in the second place, whether it itself can be considered to be a ‘court or tribunal’, within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU, read together with the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter, in the light of the criteria set out by the Court in that regard, in particular the criterion pertaining to the independence of the body concerned.

...

37) The conclusion of the Verwaltungsgericht Wiesbaden (Administrative Court of Wiesbaden) is that, probably, it does not satisfy the conditions laid down in the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter governing whether it can be regarded as an independent and impartial tribunal.

38) In those circumstances, the Verwaltungsgericht Wiesbaden (Administrative Court of Wiesbaden) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling:

‘(1) Is [Regulation 2016/679], in particular [its] Article 15, [headed “Right of access by the data subject”], applicable to the committee of a parliament of a Federated State of a Member State that is responsible for dealing with the petitions of citizens — in this case the Petitions Committee of the Parliament of Land Hessen — and is that committee to be regarded in that connection as a public authority within the meaning of Article 4(7) of Regulation 2016/679?

(2) Is the referring court an independent and impartial court or tribunal within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU read in conjunction with the second paragraph of Article 47 of [the Charter]?’

...

40) Suffice it to state, in that regard, that the request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of EU law, whether of Regulation 2016/679 or of Article 267 TFEU, read together with Article 47 of the Charter.

...

42) By its second question, the Verwaltungsgericht Wiesbaden (Administrative Court of Wiesbaden) expresses doubt as to its own status as a ‘court or tribunal’, within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter. Accordingly, it is in fact inviting the Court to examine the admissibility of its request for a preliminary ruling, given that being a ‘court or tribunal’, within the meaning of Article 267, is a condition of that admissibility and, consequently, a prerequisite of the interpretation by the Court of the provision of EU law specified in the first question.

...

45) In that regard, it must be recalled that the independence of the judges of the Member States is of fundamental importance for the EU legal order in various respects. It is informed, first, by the principle of the rule of law, which is one of the values on which, under Article 2 TEU, the Union is founded and which are common to the Member States, and by Article 19 TEU, which gives concrete expression to that value and entrusts shared responsibility for ensuring judicial review within the EU legal order to national courts or tribunals (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 February 2018, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, C‑64/16, EU:C:2018:117, paragraph 32). Second, that independence is a necessary condition if individuals are to be guaranteed, within the scope of EU law, the fundamental right to an independent and impartial tribunal laid down in Article 47 of the Charter, which is of cardinal importance as a guarantee of the protection of all the rights that individuals derive from EU law (see, to that effect, inter alia, judgment of 26 March 2020, Review Simpson v Council and HG v Commission, C‑542/18 RX‑II and C‑543/18 RX II, EU:C:2020:232, paragraphs 70 and 71 and the case-law cited). Last, that independence is essential to the proper working of the judicial cooperation system embodied by the preliminary ruling mechanism under Article 267 TFEU, in that that mechanism may be activated only by a body responsible for applying EU law, which satisfies, inter alia, that criterion of independence (see, in particular, judgment of 21 January 2020, Banco de Santander, C‑274/14, EU:C:2020:17, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited).