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Germany / Federal Administrative Court / C 4.19

Unknown asylum seeker vs. the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees
Deciding body type
National Court/Tribunal
Deciding body
Federal Administrative Court
Type
Decision
Decision date
11/02/2021
ECLI (European case law identifier)
ECLI:DE:BVerwG:2020:210420U1C4.19.0

Karta tad-Drittijiet Fundamentali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

Title I: Dignity

Article 4 - Prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment

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  • Germany / Federal Administrative Court / C 4.19
    Key facts of the case:
    The plaintiff is a stateless Palestinian from Syria who arrived in Bulgaria in 2013, where he was recognized as refugee and enjoyed as such the right of subsidiary protection. From Bulgaria, he migrated via Romania, Hungary and Austria further to Germany where he applied for asylum in November 2013. The plaintiff’s application was rejected by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge) in February 2014. The BAMF argued without substantive examination that the application was inmissible due to the fact that the plaintiff had entered from a “safe third country”, namely Austria. Against this decision the plaintiff lodged a complaint with an Administrative Court Trier which dismissed the complaint. The Higher Administrative Court Koblenz upheld the dismissal of the first instance and confirmed the finding that the plaintiff is not entitled to asylum due to the fact that at least Austria is to be considered as a “safe third country”. The plaintiff lodged an appeal against this decision with the Federal Administrative Court. The Federal Administrative Court referred several questions regarding the interpretation of Directive 2013/32/EU and art. 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights to the CJEU, before eventually deciding the case in April 2020.The plaintiff is a stateless Palestinian from Syria who arrived in Bulgaria in 2013, where he was recognized as refugee and enjoyed as such the right of subsidiary protection. From Bulgaria, he migrated via Romania, Hungary and Austria further to Germany where he applied for asylum in November 2013. The plaintiff’s application was rejected by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge) in February 2014. The BAMF argued without substantive examination that the application was inmissible due to the fact that the plaintiff had entered from a “safe third country”, namely Austria. Against this decision the plaintiff lodged a complaint with an Administrative Court Trier which dismissed the complaint. The Higher Administrative Court Koblenz upheld the dismissal of the first instance and confirmed the finding that the plaintiff is not entitled to asylum due to the fact that at least Austria is to be considered as a “safe third country”. The plaintiff lodged an appeal against this decision with the Federal Administrative Court. The Federal Administrative Court referred several questions regarding the interpretation of Directive 2013/32/EU and art. 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights to the CJEU, before eventually deciding the case in April 2020.
    Key legal question raised by the Court:
    The Federal Administrative Court had to decide whether the finding that the plaintiff had no right to asylum due to the fact that he entered from a “safe third country” was legitimate or not. The Court had to assess both whether Austria was to be considered a “safe third country” in the sense of section 29 (1) of the German Asylum Act (Asylgesetz) and whether the BAMF’s decision to declare the the plaintiff’s application inadmissible was exceptionally illicit in the light of the protection warranted by European Union law.
    Outcome of the case:

    The Federal Administrative Court found that Austria cannot be considered a “safe third country“, because a “safe third country” in the sense of the Asylum Act interpreted in the light of European Union law can only be a state which is not a Member State of the European Union. Concerning the question whether the BAMF’s decision to declare the plaintiff’s application inadmissible was exceptionally illicit on the grounds of European Union law, the Court found that this would be especially the case, if the plaintiff’s living conditions as recognised refugee in the other Member state constituted a serious danger of an inhuman or degrading treatment in the sense of article 4 of the Charta of Fundamental Rights. However, based on the facts established by the Higher Administrative Court, the Court could not answer the latter question definitively. Hence, the case was referred back to the Higher Administrative Court Koblenz to establish the all facts needed to decide if the plaintiff’s right warranted by Article 4 of the Charter is at risk.

     

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter

    "If the written requirements of § 29 (1) No. 2 AsylG are therefore met, an inadmissibility decision under this provision can nevertheless be ruled out on exceptional grounds of overriding Union law in accordance with the case law of the CJEU. This is the case if the living conditions which the applicant or plaintiff as a person whose entitlement to protection is recognised would expect in the other Member State would expose him or her to a serious risk of experiencing inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. In those circumstances, Member States are prohibited from exercising the power conferred by Article 33(2)(a) of Directive 2013/32/EU to reject an application for international protection as inadmissible on the ground that the applicant has already been granted international protection by another Member State. It is thus clarified that infringements of Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the Member State that has granted protection must not only be taken into account when examining the legality of a threat of expulsion; they rather cause the illegality of the inadmissibility decision. In response to the submission of the Senate [of the Federal Administrative Court], the European Court of Justice has also, in the 'Ibrahim' judgment – following the 'Jawo' judgment of the same date – specified in more detail the measuring stick for a violation of Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights due to the living conditions in the state where protection is granted. According to this judgment, weaknesses of systemic or general nature or affecting specific groups of persons only fall under Article 4 of the Charter if they reach a particularly high threshold of relevance. If this threshold is met is determined by all circumstances of the case; it would be reached if the indifference of the authorities of a Member State would put a person who is wholly dependent on public welfare, irrespective of his will and personal choices, into a situation of extreme material deprivation that prevents him to satisfy most basic needs, in particular to feed, wash and find accommodation, and which affects his physical or mental health or places him in a state of impoverishment incompatible with human dignity The threshold is not reached even in situations of extreme poverty or serious deterioration in the person's living conditions, provided that these do not mean extreme material deprivation which places the person in a situation of such seriousness that it may be considered equivalent to inhuman or degrading treatment".

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter (original language)

    „Liegen demnach die geschriebenen Voraussetzungen des § 29 Abs. 1 Nr. 2 AsylG vor, kann eine Unzulässigkeitsentscheidung nach dieser Regelung nach der Rechtsprechung des EuGH aus Gründen vorrangigen Unionsrechts gleichwohl ausnahmsweise ausgeschlossen sein. Das ist der Fall, wenn die Lebensverhältnisse, die den Antragsteller bzw. Kläger als anerkannten Schutzberechtigten in dem anderen Mitgliedstaat erwarten würden, ihn der ernsthaften Gefahr aussetzen würden, eine unmenschliche oder erniedrigende Behandlung im Sinne von Art. 4 GRC zu erfahren. Unter diesen Voraussetzungen ist es den Mitgliedstaaten untersagt, von der durch Art. 33 Abs. 2 Buchst. a Richtlinie 2013/32/EU eingeräumten Befugnis Gebrauch zu machen, einen Antrag auf internationalen Schutz deshalb als unzulässig abzulehnen, weil dem Antragsteller bereits von einem anderen Mitgliedstaat internationaler Schutz zuerkannt worden ist. Es ist damit geklärt, dass Verstöße gegen Art. 4 GRC im Mitgliedstaat der anderweitigen Schutzgewährung nicht nur bei der Prüfung der Rechtmäßigkeit einer Abschiebungsandrohung zu berücksichtigen sind, sondern bereits zur Rechtswidrigkeit der Unzulässigkeitsentscheidung führen. Auf die Vorlage des Senats hat der EuGH außerdem im Urteil ‘Ibrahim’ – in Anlehnung an das Urteil ‘Jawo’ vom gleichen Tag – den Maßstab für eine Verletzung von Art. 4 GRC durch die Lebensbedingungen im Staat der Schutzgewährung näher konkretisiert. Danach fallen systemische oder allgemeine oder bestimmte Personengruppen betreffende Schwachstellen nur dann unter Art. 4 GRC, wenn sie eine besonders hohe Schwelle der Erheblichkeit erreichen, die von sämtlichen Umständen des Falles abhängt und die dann erreicht wäre, wenn die Gleichgültigkeit der Behörden eines Mitgliedstaats zur Folge hätte, dass eine vollständig von öffentlicher Unterstützung abhängige Person sich unabhängig von ihrem Willen und ihren persönlichen Entscheidungen in einer Situation extremer materieller Not befände, die es ihr nicht erlaubte, ihre elementarsten Bedürfnisse zu befriedigen, wie insbesondere sich zu ernähren, sich zu waschen und eine Unterkunft zu finden, und die ihre physische oder psychische Gesundheit beeinträchtigte oder sie in einen Zustand der Verelendung versetzte, der mit der Menschenwürde unvereinbar wäre. Diese Schwelle ist selbst bei durch große Armut oder eine starke Verschlechterung der Lebensverhältnisse der betreffenden Person gekennzeichneten Situationen nicht erreicht, sofern diese nicht mit extremer materieller Not verbunden sind, aufgrund deren die betreffende Person sich in einer solch schwerwiegenden Situation befindet, dass sie einer unmenschlichen oder erniedrigenden Behandlung gleichgestellt werden kann.“