1) This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) and the principle of effectiveness.

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28) In those circumstances, the Verwaltungsgericht Wien (Administrative Court, Vienna) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘(1) Are the combined provisions of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 of the Charter, together with the principle of effectiveness, at least with regard to a national legal system which, for the purpose of safeguarding the independence and impartiality of the courts, establishes in its constitution a fundamental right to the allocation of cases to judges in accordance with a predetermined order under general rules, to be interpreted as meaning that the legislature must ensure that this fundamental guarantee is effective and not merely theoretical?

(a) If Question (1) is to be answered in the negative, do the combined provisions of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 of the Charter, together with the principle of effectiveness, in a national legal system which has enshrined in the constitution the fundamental right to a predetermined order for the allocation of cases, impose any obligations on the legislature to safeguard that right and, if so, which obligations?

(b) If Question (1) is to be answered in the affirmative, do the combined provisions of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 of the Charter, together with the principle of effectiveness at least with regard to a national legal system which has enshrined in the constitution the fundamental right to a predetermined order for the allocation of cases, require:

– non-compliance with an instruction or action concerning the allocation of case files to a judge issued by a body with no jurisdiction under law to give such instruction or take such action?

– that the rules of procedure of a court may not grant the body responsible for allocating cases any discretion in the allocation of cases, or only to a very limited and predetermined extent? (

2)

(a) Are the combined provisions of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 of the Charter, together with the principle of effectiveness, at least with regard to a national legal system which, for the purpose of safeguarding the independence and impartiality of the courts, establishes in its constitution a fundamental right to the allocation of cases to judges in accordance with a predetermined order under general rules, to be interpreted as meaning that a judge who has doubts (i) concerning the legality of an intra-court allocation of cases or (ii) concerning the legality of an intra-court decision implementing an intra-court allocation of cases and directly affecting the activity of that judge (in particular decision regarding allocation of cases) must, with regard to those doubts, be able to lodge an appeal (at no financial cost to that judge) before another court with full powers to review the legality of the act considered to be unlawful?

(b) If Question 2(a) is to be answered in the negative, are there any other provisions to be guaranteed by the legislature which ensure that a judge is able to attain legal compliance with the statutory provisions concerning him in respect of the observance of the statutory provisions (in particular intra-court) regarding the allocation of cases?

(3)

(a) Are the combined provisions of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 of the Charter, together with the principle of effectiveness, at least with regard to a national legal system which, for the purpose of safeguarding the independence and impartiality of the courts, establishes in its constitution a fundamental right to the allocation of cases to judges in accordance with a predetermined order under general rules, to be interpreted as meaning that a party to a court case which has objections concerning (i) the legality of the internal order of allocation of jurisdiction that is prejudicial to the settlement of its case or (ii) the legality of the allocation of that case to a certain judge must, before the court has ruled, be able to lodge an appeal (without any financial burden on that party) with regard to those objections before another court with full powers to review the legality of the legal act considered to be unlawful?

(b) If Question 3(a) is to be answered in the negative, are there any other provisions to be guaranteed by the legislature which ensure that a party, before the court has ruled, is able to attain legal compliance with its fundamental right to observance of the ‘lawful judge’ principle?

(4)

(a) Are the combined provisions of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 of the Charter, together with the principle of effectiveness, at least with regard to a national legal system which, for the purpose of safeguarding the independence and impartiality of the courts, establishes in its constitution a fundamental right to the allocation of cases to judges in accordance with a predetermined order under general rules, to be interpreted as meaning that the intra-court allocation of cases and the intra-court file registration are organised in such a transparent and comprehensible manner that the judge or a party is able, without particular effort, to check that the specific allocation of files to a judge or a certain panel of judges corresponds to the provisions of the intra-court allocation of cases?

(b) If Question 4(a) is to be answered in the negative, are there any other provisions to be guaranteed by the legislature which ensure that a judge or a party is in a position to be able to obtain knowledge of the legality of a certain allocation of court cases?

(5)

(a) Are the combined provisions of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 of the Charter, together with the principle of effectiveness, at least with regard to a national legal system which, for the purpose of safeguarding the independence and impartiality of the courts, establishes in its constitution a fundamental right to the allocation of cases to judges in accordance with a predetermined order under general rules, to be interpreted as meaning that the parties to a case and the judge in a court case must be able, without particular action on their part, to acquaint themselves with the content of the case allocation rules and that the parties to a case and the judge must in this way be able to check the legality of the allocation of the case to a judge or certain panel of judges?

(b) If Question 5(a) is to be answered in the negative, are there any other provisions to be guaranteed by the legislature which ensure that a judge or a party is in a position to be able to obtain knowledge of the legality of a certain allocation of court cases?

(6) What obligations to act are incumbent upon a judge, in view of his obligation under EU law to observe the procedural provisions under EU law, who, by virtue of an (out-of-court or intra-court) legal act which cannot be challenged, is obliged to perform an act which is contrary to EU law and infringes party rights?’

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31) As regards the Court’s jurisdiction over the present reference for a preliminary ruling – jurisdiction which is disputed by the Austrian government – it should be recalled that, in the first place, so far as concerns the provisions of the Charter, in the context of a request for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU, the Court may interpret EU law only within the limits of the powers conferred upon it (judgment of 19 November 2019, A.K. and Others (Independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court), C‑585/18, C‑624/18 and C‑625/18, EU:C:2019:982, paragraph 77 and the case-law cited).

32) The scope of the Charter, in so far as the action of the Member States is concerned, is defined in Article 51(1) thereof, according to which the provisions of the Charter are addressed to the Member States when they are implementing EU law. That provision confirms the Court’s settled case-law, which states that the fundamental rights guaranteed in the legal order of the European Union are applicable in all situations governed by EU law, but not outside such situations (judgment of 19 November 2019, A.K. and Others (Independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court), C‑585/18, C‑624/18 and C‑625/18, EU:C:2019:982, paragraph 78 and the case-law cited).

33) In this case, as far as concerns more specifically Article 47 of the Charter, covered by the present request for a preliminary ruling, it must be noted that the dispute brought before the referring judge concerns, in essence, the lawfulness of an administrative decision adopted by BUAK which is, in the referring judge’s opinion, the guarantee body provided for in Austrian law in order to ensure that workers benefit from the protection deriving from Article 7 of Directive 2003/88. That judge does not, however, raise any question in relation to the interpretation of Article 7 of that directive, nor does he set out the reasons why that provision is relevant for the dispute in the main proceedings. The mere fact that, according to the referring judge, BUAK ‘stems’ from Article 7 of Directive 2003/88 is not sufficient to find that the dispute in the main proceedings is governed by EU law, in accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraph 32 of this order.

34) It follows from the foregoing that there is nothing to indicate that the dispute in the main proceedings relates to the interpretation or application of a rule of EU law which is implemented at national level. Therefore, the Court does not have jurisdiction to interpret Article 47 of the Charter in the present case.

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36) As regards the scope of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, it follows, moreover, from the Court’s case-law that that provision refers to the ‘fields covered by Union law’, irrespective of whether the Member States are implementing Union law within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter (judgment of 26 March 2020, Miasto Łowicz and Prokurator Generalny, C‑558/18 and C‑563/18, EU:C:2020:234, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).