20) It was in those circumstances that the Cour du travail de Liège (Higher Labour Court, Liège) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘Does point 1 of the first subparagraph of Article 57(2) of the Organic Law of 8 July 1976 on public social welfare centres infringe Articles 5 and 13 of Directive 2008/115/EC, read in the light of Articles 19(2) and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and Article 14(1)(b) of that directive and Articles 7 and 12 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union as interpreted by … the judgment [of 18 December 2014, Abdida (C‑562/13, EU:C:2014:2453)]:

• first, in so far as it results in depriving a third-country national, staying illegally on the territory of a Member State, of provision, in so far as possible, for his basic needs pending resolution of the action for suspension and annulment that he has brought in his own name as the representative of his child, who was at that time a minor, against a decision ordering them to leave the territory of a Member State;
• where, second, on the one hand, that child who has now come of age suffers from a serious illness and the enforcement of that decision may expose that child to a serious risk of grave and irreversible deterioration in her state of health and, on the other, the presence of that parent alongside his daughter who has now come of age is considered to be imperative by the medical professional given that she is particularly vulnerable as a result of her state of health (recurrent sickle cell crises and the need for surgery in order to prevent paralysis)?’

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21) The Belgian Government submits that the request for a preliminary ruling is inadmissible as it concerns the compatibility of a rule of Belgian law with various provisions of Directive 2008/115 and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), where there is, according to that government, no connection between LM’s situation and EU law.

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23) Moreover, since LM is not suffering from a serious illness, his possible removal could not constitute a breach of Article 5 of that directive, read in the light of Article 19(2) of the Charter. Thus, his situation is not comparable to that at issue in the case which gave rise to the judgment of 18 December 2014, Abdida (C‑562/13, EU:C:2014:2453).

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28) By its question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Articles 5, 13 and 14 of Directive 2008/115, read in the light of Article 7, Article 19(2) and Articles 21 and 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which does not provide, in so far as possible, for the basic needs of a third-country national where:

• that third-country national has brought an action against a return decision made in respect of him or her;
• the adult child of that third-country national is suffering from a serious illness;
• the presence of that third-country national with that adult child is essential to that child, and
• that an appeal was brought on behalf of that adult child against a return decision taken against him or her, the enforcement of which may expose that adult child to a serious risk of grave and irreversible deterioration in his or her state of health.

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34) However, the characteristics of that remedy must be determined in accordance with Article 47 of the Charter, under which everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by EU law are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in that article and with the principle of non-refoulement, guaranteed, inter alia, in Article 19(2) of the Charter and in Article 5 of Directive 2008/115 (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 December 2014, Abdida, C‑562/13, EU:C:2014:2453, paragraphs 45 and 46, and of 19 June 2018, Gnandi, C‑181/16, EU:C:2018:465, paragraphs 52 and 53).

35) From the foregoing considerations, the Court has concluded that, in order to ensure that the requirements arising from Article 47 of the Charter and the principle of non-refoulement are complied with in respect of the third-country national concerned, an appeal against a return decision must have automatic suspensive effect, since the enforcement of that decision may, inter alia, expose that national to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 19(2) of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 June 2018, Gnandi, C‑181/16, EU:C:2018:465, paragraph 56).

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37) By contrast, it is clear that the parent of such a third-country national is not, by virtue of that status alone, directly exposed to a risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 19(2) of the Charter in the event of enforcement of a return decision.

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41) Therefore, to allow the enforcement of such a return decision before the arguments based on the situation of that child have been examined by a competent authority would risk depriving that child, in practice, of the protection that that child must enjoy under Articles 5 and 13 of Directive 2008/115, read in the light of Article 19(2) and Article 47 of the Charter. Therefore, in order to ensure the effectiveness of that protection, the parent of that child must, under those provisions, be entitled to an appeal with automatic suspensive effect against a return decision taken in respect of him or her.

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43) Furthermore, since the Belgian Government submits that an appeal with automatic suspensive effect should, in any event, be guaranteed only against a removal decision and not against a return decision, it should be pointed out that the judicial protection afforded to a third-country national who is the subject of a return decision, the enforcement of which may expose him to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 19(2) of the Charter, is insufficient if that third-country national did not have available to him or her such an appeal with suspensive effect against that decision.

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55) In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the question referred is that Articles 5, 13 and 14 of Directive 2008/115, read in the light of Article 7, Article 19(2) and Articles 21 and 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which does not provide, as far as possible, for the basic needs of a third-country national to be met where:

• that national has appealed against a return decision made in respect of him or her;
• the adult child of that third-country national is suffering from a serious illness;
• the presence of that third-country national with that adult child is essential;
• an appeal was brought on behalf of that adult child against a return decision taken against him or her, the enforcement of which may expose that adult child to a serious risk of grave and irreversible deterioration in his or her state of health, and
• that third-country national does not have the means to meet his or her needs himself or herself.

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56) Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the national court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable. On those grounds, the Court (First Chamber) hereby rules: Articles 5, 13 and 14 of Directive 2008/115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, read in the light of Article 7, Article 19(2) and Articles 21 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which does not provide, as far as possible, for the basic needs of a third-country national to be met where:

• that national has appealed against a return decision made in respect of him or her;
• the adult child of that third-country national is suffering from a serious illness;
• the presence of that third-country national with that adult child is essential;
• an appeal was brought on behalf of that adult child against a return decision taken against him or her, the enforcement of which may expose that adult child to a serious risk of grave and irreversible deterioration in his or her state of health, and
• that third-country national does not have the means to meet his or her needs himself or herself.