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Lithuania / Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania / 7/2019-10/2019

Appellants: Telšiai district court and Vilnius city district court
Deciding body type
National Court/Tribunal
Deciding body
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania
Type
Decision
Decision date
24/07/2020

Listina Evropske unije o temeljnih pravicah

Title VI: Justice

Article 49 - Principles of legality and proportionality of criminal offences and penalties

Title VI: Justice

Article 50 - Right not to be tried or punished twice in criminal proceedings for the same criminal offence

Title VII: General provisions

Article 52 - Scope and interpretation

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  • Lithuania / Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania / 7/2019-10/2019
    Key facts of the case:
    The Telšiai district court and the Vilnius city court adjudicated administrative cases where the complainants appealed decisions of the police authorities refusing to reinstate their driving permissions , which have been revoked for 10 years due to the complainants’ driving twice under influence. The police authorities based their decision on Article 24 Paragraph 7 of the Law on Safe Traffic on Automobile Roads, which provides that if a person was twice deprived of his or her driving permission due to driving under the influence, the driving permission can be reinstated no earlier than after ten years. Both courts appealed to the Constitutional Court requesting the Court to clarify whether the said provision of the Law on Safe Traffic on Automobile Roads does not contradict the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania.
    The appellants argued that the revocation of the driving permission for a certain time constitutes a sanction which has negative implications for the persons’ rights. According to the appellants, under the existing regulation, a person who drove under the influence is being punished twice: firstly, by depriving them of the driving permission under the Code of Administrative Offences and the Criminal Code up to five years, and secondly, by suspending their driving permission for no less than ten years under the Law on the Safe Traffic on Automobile Roads. The appellants argued that such sanction contradicts the constitutional principle of proportionality. Furthermore, the said provision of the Law on the Safe Traffic on Automobile Roads provides for no exceptions, hence the courts can only formally apply this provision and are prevented from using their discretion in individual cases.
     
    Key legal question raised by the Court:
    The key legal question raised by the Court was whether Article 24 Paragraph 7 and Paragraph 8 of the Law on Safe Traffic on Automobile Roads contradicts Article 31 Paragraph 5 (No one may be punished for the same crime a second time) of the Constitution, and constitutional principles of non bis in idem, justice, proportionality and the rule of law.
     
    Outcome of the case:
    The Court concluded that Paragraphs 7 and 8 of Article 24 of the Law on Safe Traffic on Automobile Roads contradict Article 31 Paragraph 5 of the Constitution, providing that no one may be punished for the same crime a second time. Paragraph 8 of Article 24 of the said law provides that if a person was deprived of his or her driving permission three times, this permission can be reinstated after no less than ten years. The Court held that under the Constitution, inter alia, constitutional principle of the rule of law, it is in the public interest to ensure safe traffic, inter alia, on automobile roads; the legislator must enact such safe traffic requirements, which are necessary to ensure public order, public safety, human life and health. The Court also held that the legislator may enact such regulation, under which the driving permission may be suspended for persons who conducted serious violations of traffic rules; the legislator may also provide for sanctions in such cases. However, the Court also drew attention to the constitutional principle non bis in idem, which means a prohibition to punish someone twice for the same unlawful activity; according to the Court, this principle in itself does not negate a possibility of applying more than one sanction of the same type to the same person; whether non bis in idem principle is violated, it can be said only after evaluating the nature of legal violations, for which the sanctions are provided, also the aims of public importance, which are sought by the legislator. Furthermore, the Court held that constitutional principles of justice and the rule of law suggest, that punitive measures provided for legal violations must be proportionate to the violation; there must be the right balance (proportionality) between the aim to punish the offenders and ensure prevention of legal violations, and the means chosen to achieve this aim. The Court held that the term of ten years of suspension of the driving permission, provided by Paragraphs 7 and 8 of Article 24 of the Law on Safe Traffic on Automobile Roads, by its nature amounts to a sanction, which can be applied to a person who drove under the influence twice or was deprived of their driving permission three times because of safe traffic violations, which is applied together with sanctions foreseen in the Code of Administrative Offences and the Criminal Code – suspension of the driving permission for up to a maximum of five years. According to the Court, the contested provisions of the Law on Safe Traffic on Automobile Roads impose a sanction of suspension of driving permission for 10 years. Therefore a sanction, that is applied under the Code of Administrative Offences and the Criminal Code for the same legal offence, that is, suspension of the driving permission for up to 5 years, is being rendered meaningless. Such legal regulation, providing for both administrative and criminal sanction (suspension of driving permission) to be imposed for the same offence, where administrative sanction is stricter than the criminal one, is to be considered as contradictory. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the relevant provisions of the Law on Safe Traffic on Automobile Roads contradict the constitutional non bis in idem principle. The Court also held, that the legislator, by enacting this legal regulation, ignored the imperatives of consistency and cohesion of the legal framework, arising from the constitutional rule of law principle, and the requirements of reasonableness, justice and proportionality.
     
     
  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter

    13. In the context of this constitutional case, the provisions of European Union’s and other international legal acts, related with the principle non bis in idem, are to be mentioned. 13.1. Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union “Right not to be tried or punished twice in criminal proceedings for the same criminal offence” provides that no one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings for an offence for which they have already been finally acquitted or convicted within the Union in accordance with the law. 13.1.1. Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), whilst interpreting Article 50 of the Charter, has noted that according to the principle non bis in idem it is prohibited both, to conduct a prosecution and apply criminal punishments, how they are being understood under this Article, for the same [criminal] act of the same person (Judgment of 20 March 2018, Menci, C-524/15, paragraph 25, Judgment of 20 March 2018, Garlsson Real Estate and Others, C-537/16, paragraph 27). 13.1.2. According to the jurisprudence of the CJEU, whilst assessing the punitive nature of the sanction, three criteria are important: first – qualification of the legal offence according to the national law, second – the nature of the offence, and third – the nature of the applicable

    sanction and the level of its strictness (Judgment of 20 March 2018, Menci, C-524/15, paragraph 26, Judgment of 20 March 2018, Garlsson Real Estate and Others, C-537/16, paragraph 28). 13.1.3. CJEU has noted that a sanction with a repressive aim is of a punitive nature, how it is understood under Article 50 of the Charter, and that the only circumstance that a preventative aim is being sought with it as well, cannot annul its qualification as a punitive sanction (Judgment of 20 March 2018, Menci, C-524/15, paragraph 31, Judgment of 20 March 2018, Garlsson Real Estate and Others, C-537/16, paragraph 33). The level of strictness of the sanction can also indicate its attributability to sanctions of a punitive nature (Judgment of 20 March 2018, Menci, C-524/15, paragraph 33, Judgment of 20 March 2018, Garlsson Real Estate and Others, C-537/16, paragraph 35). 13.1.4. According to the jurisprudence of the CJEU, whilst assessing whether the same offence has been committed, an appropriate criterion for this [aim] is the criterion of identity of the material acts, understood as the existence of a set of concrete circumstances which are inextricably linked together, because of which a certain person has been finally acquitted or finally convicted (Judgment of 18 July 2007, Kraaijenbrink, C-367/05, paragraph 26, Judgment of 16 November, Mantello, C-261/09, paragraphs 39, 40). Hence under Article 50 of the Charter it is prohibited to apply several punitive sanctions for the same act after the end of the related procedures (Judgment of 20 March 2018, Menci, C-524/15, paragraph 35, Judgment of 20 March 2018, Garlsson Real Estate and Others, C-537/16, paragraph 37). 13.1.5. CJEU specifies that the national legal acts must ensure that the burden applied to certain persons because of a cumulative persecution and application of sanctions should be restricted to only what is strictly necessary to achieve the aim of common interest. For the application of cumulative sanctions, rules must be applicable so as to ensure that the strictness of all the applied sanctions correspond to the gravity of the offence, because such requirement is not only enshrined in Article 52 Paragraph 1 of the Charter, but also arises from Article 49 Paragraph 3 of the Charter, providing for the principle of proportionality of punishments. These rules must provide for an obligation on the competent authorities to monitor that where a second sanction is applied, the strictness of all applied sanctions does not exceed the gravity of the established crime (Judgment of 20 March 2018, Menci, C-524/15, paragraph 55, Judgment of 20 March 2018, Garlsson Real Estate and Others, C-537/16, paragraph 56).

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter (original language)

    13. Šios konstitucinės justicijos bylos kontekste paminėtinos Europos Sąjungos ir tarptautinės teisės aktų nuostatos, susijusios su principu non bis in idem. 13.1. Europos Sąjungos pagrindinių teisių chartijos (toliau – Chartija) 50 straipsnyje „Teisė nebūti du kartus teisiamam ar baudžiamam už tą pačią nusikalstamą veiką“ nustatyta, kad niekas negali būti antrą kartą teisiamas ar baudžiamas už nusikalstamą veiką, dėl kurios Europos Sąjungoje jis jau buvo galutinai išteisintas ar pripažintas kaltu pagal įstatymą. 13.1.1. Europos Sąjungos Teisingumo Teismas (toliau – ESTT), aiškindamas Chartijos 50 straipsnį, yra pažymėjęs, kad pagal principą non bis in idem draudžiama kartu tiek vykdyti persekiojimą, tiek taikyti baudžiamojo pobūdžio sankcijas, kaip tai suprantama pagal šį straipsnį, už tą pačią to paties asmens veiką (2018 m. kovo 20 d. sprendimo byloje C-524/15 Menci 25 punktas, 2018 m. kovo 20 d. sprendimo byloje C-537/16 Garlsson Real Estate ir kt. 27 punktas). 13.1.2. Pagal ESTT jurisprudenciją vertinant sankcijos baudžiamąjį pobūdį yra svarbūs trys kriterijai: pirmasis – teisinis pažeidimo kvalifikavimas pagal vidaus teisę, antrasis – pats pažeidimo pobūdis ir trečiasis – gresiančios sankcijos pobūdis ir griežtumo laipsnis (2018 m. kovo 20 d. sprendimo byloje C-524/15 Menci 26 punktas, 2018 m. kovo 20 d. sprendimo byloje C-537/16 Garlsson Real Estate ir kt. 28 punktas). 13.1.3. ESTT yra pažymėjęs, kad sankcija, kuria siekiama represinio tikslo, yra baudžiamojo pobūdžio, kaip tai suprantama pagal Chartijos 50 straipsnį, ir kad vienintelė aplinkybė, jog ja siekiama ir prevencijos tikslo, negali panaikinti jos kvalifikavimo kaip baudžiamosios sankcijos (2018 m. kovo 20 d. sprendimo byloje C-524/15 Menci 31 punktas, 2018 m. kovo 20 d. sprendimo byloje C-537/16 Garlsson Real Estate ir kt. 33 punktas). Sankcijos griežtumo laipsnis taip pat gali rodyti jos priskirtinumą baudžiamojo pobūdžio sankcijoms (2018 m. kovo 20 d. sprendimo byloje C-524/15 Menci 33 punktas, 2018 m. kovo 20 d. sprendimo byloje C-537/16 Garlsson Real Estate ir kt. 35 punktas). 13.1.4. Pagal ESTT jurisprudenciją, vertinant, ar buvo padarytas tas pats pažeidimas, tinkamas tam kriterijus yra tapačios veikų materialiosios sudėties krit

    išteisintas arba galutinai nuteistas (2007 m. liepos 18 d. sprendimo byloje C-367/05 Kraaijenbrink 26 punktas, 2010 m. lapkričio 16 d. sprendimo byloje C-261/09 Mantello 39, 40 punktai). Taigi pagal Chartijos 50 straipsnį draudžiama už tą pačią veiką skirti kelias baudžiamojo pobūdžio sankcijas pasibaigus įvairiems su tuo susijusiems procesams (2018 m. kovo 20 d. sprendimo byloje C-524/15 Menci 35 punktas, 2018 m. kovo 20 d. sprendimo byloje C-537/16 Garlsson Real Estate ir kt. 37 punktas). 13.1.5. ESTT nurodo, jog nacionalinės teisės aktuose taip pat turi būti užtikrinta, kad tam tikriems asmenims tenkanti našta dėl kumuliatyvaus persekiojimo ir sankcijų taikymo apsiribotų tik tuo, kas griežtai būtina siekiant įgyvendinti bendrojo intereso tikslą. Kumuliatyviam baudžiamojo pobūdžio sankcijų taikymui turi būti taikomos taisyklės, leidžiančios užtikrinti, kad visų skirtų sankcijų griežtumas atitiktų nagrinėjamo pažeidimo sunkumą, nes toks reikalavimas ne tik nustatytas Chartijos 52 straipsnio 1 dalyje, bet ir išplaukia iš Chartijos 49 straipsnio 3 dalyje nustatyto bausmių proporcingumo principo. Šiose taisyklėse kompetentingoms valdžios institucijoms turi būti nustatyta pareiga stebėti, kad tuo atveju, kai skiriama antra sankcija, visų skirtų sankcijų griežtumas neviršytų konstatuoto nusikaltimo sunkumo (2018 m. kovo 20 d. sprendimo byloje C-524/15 Menci 52, 55 punktai, 2018 m. kovo 20 d. sprendimo byloje C-537/16 Garlsson Real Estate ir kt. 54, 56 punktai).