1) This reference for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of the principle of stating reasons for the acts of public authorities, laid down by the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU and Article 41(2)(c) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the ‘Charter’).

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11) The Corte dei conti, sezione giurisdizionale per la Regione Siciliana, further submits that the questions referred are admissible. Article 1(1) of Law No 241/1990 contains a direct, unconditional renvoi to principles derived from the legal order of the Union. The Consiglio di Stato (Council of State) held, in a recent judgment (sez. V 4035/2009), that principles of EU law apply directly in the internal legal order and must govern the actions of the administration. Thus, it must be considered that the duty to state reasons referred to in the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU and Article 41(2)(c) of the Charter applies to all activities of the Italian administration, whether they are exercised in the implementation of EU law or in the context of the administration’s own powers.

12) In those circumstances, even though, in this case, the action in the main proceedings concerns a purely internal situation, this reference for a preliminary ruling should, in accordance with the Court’s case-law, be considered as admissible. Considering that the resolution of that dispute depends on the interpretation of those provisions of EU law, the Corte dei conti, sezione giurisdizionale per la Regione Siciliana, has decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling:

‘(1) Are the interpretation and application of Article 3 of [Law No 241/1990] and Article 3 of [Sicilian Regional Law No 10/1991] – in relation to Article 1 of [Law 241/1990], which requires the Italian administrative authorities to apply the principles of [EU] law, pursuant to the duty to state reasons for the acts of public authorities laid down in the second paragraph of Article 296 [TFEU] and Article 41(2)(c) of [the Charter] – to the effect that measures of public authorities in private-law form, that is to say, measures relating to individual rights and that are in any event mandatory, in matters relating to pensions, may be exempted from the duty to state reasons, compatible with EU law, and does such a case amount to infringement of an essential procedural requirement governing an administrative measure?

(2) Is the first sentence of Article 21g(2) of [Law No 241/1990], as interpreted by the administrative case-law – in relation to the duty to state reasons for an administrative measure laid down by Article 3 of [Law 241/1990] and Article 3 of [Sicilian Regional Law No 10/1991], together with the duty to state reasons for the acts of public authorities laid down by the second paragraph of Article 296 [TFEU] and Article 41(2)(c) of [the Charter] – compatible with Article 1 of [Law No 241/1990], which requires the administration to apply the principles of the legal order of the Union, and, consequently, is it compatible and permissible to interpret and apply that provision as allowing the authorities to supplement a statement of reasons for an administrative measure during the proceedings?’

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25) On the other hand, Article 1 of Law No 241/1990 makes a renvoi in a general manner to ‘principles derived from the Community legal order’, and not specifically to the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU and Article 41(2)(c) of the Charter, referred to by the questions raised or even to other rules of EU law concerning the duty to state reasons for acts.

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28) In that regard, it should be noted that the Corte dei conti, sezione giurisdizionale per la Regione Siciliana, does not indicate at all whether that renvoi has the consequence of setting aside the national rules relating to the duty to state reasons and of replacing them with the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU and Article 41(2)(c) of the Charter, which are addressed, indeed, according to their wording, not to the Member States but solely to the EU institutions and bodies, or indeed with other rules of EU law relating to the duty to state reasons, even when it is a purely internal situation at issue, in order to treat purely internal situations and those governed by EU law in the same manner.

29) Thus, neither the decision to refer nor Law No 241/1990 contains precise enough indications from which it could be deduced that, by referring, in Article 1 of Law No 241/1990, to principles deriving from EU law, the national legislature intended, in relation to the duty to state reasons, to make a renvoi to the content of the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU and Article 41(2)(c) of the Charter, or indeed to other rules of EU law concerning the duty to state reasons for acts, in order that internal situations and situations falling within EU law should be treated in the same way. It cannot therefore be concluded that there is, in this case, a definite interest of the Union in preserving uniformity of interpretation of those provisions.