Luxembourg / Higher Administrative Court of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg / Case no. 44376C

Key facts of the case:

On 13 December 2017 the plaintiff lodged a request for international protection with the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, Directorate of Immigration. On 17 April 2019, the Minister ruled on the merits of his application, refused granting him international protection and ordered the plaintiff to leave the territory of Luxemburg. The plaintiff appealed the decision on the same day. The Administrative Tribunal declared the appeal manifestly ill-founded in so far as directed against the refusal of granting him international protection, arguing that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that his country of origin, Benin, could not be regarded as a safe country. However, in a separate procedure, the Administrative Tribunal declared the appeal justified in so far as directed against the order to leave the territory and quashed that part of the decision, relying on the fact that the plaintiff has been living in a family relationship with her companion who holds a permanent residence permit in Luxembourg, with whom he has a child and who is pregnant with their second child. The Administrative Tribunal arrived to the conclusion that the obligation for the plaintiff to leave the territory of Luxembourg where his partner and their common son are located constitutes a disproportionate interference with his right to respect for family life. On 22 April 2020 the State party appealed against the judgment.

Key legal question raised by the Court:

The State party argued that the decision of the Minister declaring the stay illegal would necessarily imply the decision to leave the territory, which should be interpreted as an automatic legal consequence of the refusal of international protection. He further emphasised that the question of whether the plaintiff had the right to remain in Luxembourg on account of his family life would fall within the scope of a separate procedure under the Immigration Act. At the same time, the plaintiff argued that the automatism provided for by the International Protection Act, i.e. the order to leave the territory once the request for international protection has been refused, should not prevail over Article 7 of the Charter. As the Court itself summarised, the key legal question of the case was whether the Minister would, when rejecting a foreigner's application for international protection and ordering him to leave the country, be required to consider higher standards such as Articles 7 and 24 of the Charter.

Outcome of the case:

The Court recalled that in the present case the first-instance administrative judge was called upon to rule exclusively on the existence of any reasons for the plaintiff to fear persecution in his country of origin. He had no power to rule in this context on the question of a possible violation of the right to respect for one's private and family life as guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter, considering that this issue falls neither within the scope of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 on the status of refugees nor within the scope of act of 18 December 2015 on international protection. For the same reasons, the Court held that the appeal based on a violation of section 24 of the Charter must be dismissed as unfounded as well. Hence the Court quashed the first-instance administrative judgment and upheld the decision of the Ministry ordering the plaintiff to leave the territory of Luxembourg.
Paragraphs referring to EU Charter

“The question currently before the Court is essentially whether the Minister, when he rejects a foreigner's application for international protection and orders him to leave the country, is required to consider higher standards such as those advanced in this case, namely Article 8 of the ECHR and Articles 7 and 24 of the Charter. […] The Court wishes to recall that the administrative judge, within the scope of his jurisdiction assigned to him by the law of 18 December 2015, is called upon to rule exclusively on the existence, in respect of a foreigner, of reasons to fear persecution in his country of origin or on the existence of serious grounds to believe that if returned to his country of origin, this person would be at real risk of serious danger under section

48 of the act of 18 December 2015. It has no power to rule in this context on the question of a possible violation of the right to respect for one's private and family life as guaranteed by Article 8 of the ECHR and Article 7 of the Charter, considering that this issue falls neither within the scope of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 on the status of refugees nor the act of 18 December 2015. For the same reasons, the ground based on a violation of Article 24 of the Charter which states that the best interests of the child must be a primary consideration in all acts affecting them (paragraph 2) and the right to maintain regular personal relationships and direct contact with both parents must be dismissed as unfounded (paragraph 2). That said, despite the automatic system put in place by article 34, paragraph (2), of the act of 18 December 2015, the person whose application for international protection has been refused and who is obliged to leave the territory has, with some exceptions, a period of thirty days from the day on which the return decision becomes final to voluntarily leave the country, which allows it, if necessary, to apply for a residence permit in availing himself of his right to respect for his private and family life. At the current stage, however, it is not for the administrative judge to examine the merits of such a request not submitted, or by necessity assessed, by the competent administrative authority. This conclusion is also not irritated by the respondent's argument based on a breach of Article 7 of the Charter taken in conjunction with Article 5 of Directive 2008/115/EC, since the impact of these provisions at the level of the order to leave the territory, having regard to the above conclusion adopted by the Court, can only arise, where appropriate, in the context of a request for authorization to stay on the basis of the provisions of the act of 29 August 2008, and not in the context of an application for international protection, it being noted that the directive expressly provides that the refusal decision may be accompanied by a return decision.”
Paragraphs referring to EU Charter (original language)

« La question qui est actuellement soumise à la Cour est en substance celle de savoir si le ministre, lorsqu’il rejette la demande de protection internationale d’un étranger et qu’il lui ordonne de quitter le territoire, est tenu de prendre en considération des normes supérieures telles celles avancées en l’espèce, à savoir l’article 8 de la CEDH et les articles 7 et 24 de la Charte. […] La Cour tient à rappeler que le juge administratif, dans le cadre de sa compétence lui attribuée par la loi du 18 décembre 2015, est appelé à se prononcer exclusivement sur l’existence, dans le chef d’un étranger, de raisons de craindre d’être persécuté dans son pays d’origine ou sur l’existence de sérieux motifs de croire qu’en cas de retour dans son pays d’origine, cette personne encourrait un risque réel de subir des atteintes graves visées à l’article 48 de la loi du 18 décembre 2015. Elle n’est pas habilitée à se prononcer, dans ce contexte, sur la question d’une éventuelle violation du droit au respect de sa vie privée et familiale tel que garanti par l’article 8 de la CEDH et l’article 7 de la Charte, étant donné que cette question ne relève ni du champ d’application de la Convention de Genève du 28 juillet 1951 relative au statut des réfugiés, ni de celui de la loi du 18 décembre 2015. Pour les mêmes motifs, il y a lieu de rejeter comme non fondés le moyen tiré d’une violation de l’article 24 de la Charte qui prévoit que l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant doit constituer une considération primordiale dans tous les actes qui les concernent (paragraphe 2) ainsi que le droit d’entretenir régulièrement des relations personnelles et des contacts directs avec leurs deux parents (paragraphe 3). Cela dit, malgré l’automatisme mis en place par l’article 34, paragraphe (2), de la loi du 18 décembre 2015, la personne dont la demande de protection internationale a été refusée et qui est dans l’obligation de quitter le territoire dispose, sauf exception, d’un délai de trente jours à compter du jour où la décision de retour sera devenue définitive pour quitter volontairement le pays, ce qui lui permet, le cas échéant, de faire une demande d’autorisation de séjour en se prévalant de son droit au respect de sa vie privée et familiale. Au stade actuel, il n’appartient toutefois pas au juge administratif d’examiner les mérites de pareille demande non soumise, ni par la force des choses toisée, par l’autorité administrative compétente. Cette conclusion n’est pas non plus énervée par l’argumentation de l’intimé fondée sur une méconnaissance de l’article 7 de la Charte pris en combinaison avec l’article 5 de la directive 2008/115/CE, dès lors que l’incidence de ces dispositions au niveau de l’ordre de quitter le territoire, eu égard à la conclusion ci-avant retenue par la Cour, ne peut se poser, le cas échéant, que dans le contexte d’une demande d’autorisation de séjour sur base des dispositions de la loi du 29 août 2008, et non pas dans le cadre d’une demande de protection internationale, étant relevé que la directive prévoit expressément que la décision de refus peut être assortie d’une décision de retour. »

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Luxembourg / Higher Administrative Court of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg / Case no. 44376C

Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell’Unione europea