1) This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 5(2) of Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings (OJ 2010 L 280, p. 1), Article 4(5) and Article 6(1) of Directive 2012/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 on the right to information in criminal proceedings (OJ 2012 L 142, p. 1), Article 6(1) and the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, Article 267 TFEU and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’).

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3) Recitals 5, 12 and 24 of Directive 2010/64 state:

‘(5) Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [, signed at Rome on 4 November 1950,] and Article 47 of the [Charter] enshrine the right to a fair trial. Article 48(2) of the Charter guarantees respect for the right of defence. This Directive respects those rights and should be implemented accordingly.

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7) Recitals 5, 30 and 34 of Directive 2012/13 are worded as follows:

‘(5) Article 47 of the [Charter] and Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter “the ECHR”) enshrine the right to a fair trial. Article 48(2) of the Charter guarantees respect for the rights of the defence.

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14) Recitals 1 and 9 of Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings (OJ 2016 L 65, p. 1), state:

‘(1) The presumption of innocence and the right to a fair trial are enshrined in Articles 47 and 48 of the [Charter], Article 6 of the [ECHR], Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the ICCPR) and Article 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

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36) In that context, while referring, first, to a number of international opinions and reports which have noted the excessive concentration of powers in the hands of the President of the NOJ and the absence of any counterbalance thereto and, secondly, to the case-law of the Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights, the referring judge asks whether such a situation is compatible with the principle of judicial independence enshrined in Article 19 TEU and Article 47 of the Charter. He also enquires whether, in such a context, the proceedings pending before him may be regarded as fair.

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38) In those circumstances the Pesti Központi Kerületi Bíróság (Central District Court, Pest, Hungary) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

...  (2) (a) Must the principle of judicial independence referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, Article 47 of the [Charter] and the case-law of the Court of Justice be interpreted as meaning that that principle is infringed where the [President of the NOJ], who is responsible for the central administration of the courts and who is appointed by the parliament, the only body to which he or she is accountable and which may remove him or her from office, fills the post of president of a court – a president who, inter alia, has powers in relation to organisation of the allocation of cases, commencement of disciplinary procedures against judges, and assessment of judges – by means of a direct temporary nomination, circumventing the applications procedure and constantly disregarding the opinion of the competent self-governance bodies of judges?

.... (3) (a) Must the principle of judicial independence referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, Article 47 of the [Charter] and the case-law of the Court of Justice be interpreted as precluding a situation in which, since 1 September 2018 – unlike the practice followed in previous decades – Hungarian judges receive by law lower remuneration than prosecutors of the equivalent category who have the same grade and the same length of service, and in which, in view of the country’s economic situation, judges’ salaries are generally not commensurate with the importance of the functions they perform, particularly in the light of the practice of discretionary bonuses applied by holders of high level posts?

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51) In those circumstances the Pesti Központi Kerületi Bíróság (Central District Court, Pest) decided to refer the following two supplementary questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

... (5) Must the principle of judicial independence, established in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, in Article 47 of the Charter and in the case-law of the Court of Justice, read in the light of Article 267 TFEU, be interpreted as meaning that that principle precludes disciplinary proceedings being brought against a judge for having made a request for a preliminary ruling?’

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83) By his fifth question, which it is appropriate to examine in the second place, the referring judge asks, in essence, whether the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, Article 47 of the Charter and Article 267 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding disciplinary proceedings from being brought against a national judge on the ground that he or she made a request for a preliminary ruling to the Court under Article 267 TFEU.

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87) Consequently, as in the case of the fourth question, the referring judge is faced with a procedural obstacle, arising from the application of national legislation against him, which he must address before he can decide the main proceedings without external interference, and therefore, in accordance with Article 47 of the Charter, in complete independence (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 July 2020, Governo della Repubblica italiana (Status of Italian magistrates), C‑658/18, EU:C:2020:572, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited). He is uncertain as to the conditions for the continuation of the main proceedings following the Kúria decision declaring the initial request for a preliminary ruling unlawful and which also served as a ground for commencing disciplinary proceedings against him. In that regard, the present case is distinguishable from those which gave rise to the judgment of 26 March 2020, Miasto Łowicz and Prokurator Generalny (C‑558/18 and C‑563/18, EU:C:2020:234), in which the answers to the questions of interpretation of EU law referred to the Court would not have been necessary for the referring courts concerned in order to resolve procedural questions of national law before being able to rule on the substance of the disputes before them.

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89) As a preliminary point, it should be noted that the fifth question refers to the interpretation of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, Article 47 of the Charter and Article 267 TFEU. However, it is apparent from the grounds of the order for reference that, as has already been pointed out in essence in paragraphs 86 and 87 above, that question arises in relation to a procedural difficulty, which must be resolved before a decision can be taken on the substance of the main proceedings and which calls into question the powers of the referring judge in the context of the procedure laid down in Article 267 TFEU. Thus, the fifth question must be examined only in the light of Article 267 TFEU.

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98) As a preliminary point, it should be noted that the first question refers to Article 6(1) TEU. However, apart from a general reference to the applicability of the Charter, that provision does not assist the referring judge’s reasoning, as is evidenced from the grounds of the initial request for a preliminary ruling. Moreover, it is a general provision by which the European Union recognises that the Charter has the same legal value as the Treaties, makes clear that the provisions of the Charter are not in any way to extend to the competences of the European Union as defined in the Treaties and provides details of the method of interpreting the rights, freedoms and principles in the Charter. In those circumstances, that provision appears irrelevant for the purposes of analysing the first question.

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100) In accordance with Article 48(1) of the Charter, everyone who has been charged must be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. Moreover, Article 48(2) of the Charter states that respect for the rights of the defence of anyone who has been charged must be guaranteed.

101) In that regard, it should be noted that Article 52(3) of the Charter states that, in so far as that charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR, the meaning and scope of those rights must be the same as those laid down by the ECHR. As is apparent from the explanations relating to Article 48 of the Charter, which, in accordance with the third subparagraph of Article 6(1) TEU and Article 52(7) of the Charter, must be taken into consideration for the interpretation of the Charter, Article 48 corresponds to Article 6(2) and (3) ECHR. The Court must, accordingly, ensure that its interpretation of Article 48 of the Charter ensures a level of protection which does not disregard that guaranteed by Article 6 ECHR, as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 July 2019, Gambino and Hyka, C‑38/18, EU:C:2019:628, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).

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118) The second part of the first question referred for a preliminary ruling seeks to ascertain whether, in the absence of such a register or other method of reviewing the adequacy of the interpretation and where it is impossible to establish whether the suspect or accused person has been informed of the suspicions or accusation against him or her, Article 4(5) and Article 6(1) of Directive 2012/13, read in the light of Article 48(2) of the Charter, must be interpreted as precluding the proceedings from being continued in absentia.

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120) Following that verification, the referring court may conclude that it cannot establish whether the person concerned was informed, in a language which he or she understands, of the accusation against him or her, either because the interpretation provided to that person was inadequate or because it is impossible to ascertain the quality of that interpretation. Consequently, the second part of the first question referred for a preliminary ruling must be understood as seeking to ascertain whether Article 4(5) and Article 6(1) of Directive 2012/13, read in the light of Article 48(2) of the Charter, are to be interpreted as precluding a person from being tried in absentia while, on account of inadequate interpretation, he or she has not been informed in a language which he or she understands of the accusation against him or her or where it is impossible to ascertain the quality of the interpretation provided and, therefore, to establish that he or she has been informed in a language he or she understands of the accusation against him or her.

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137) Consequently, Article 2(5) of Directive 2010/64 and Article 4(5) and Article 6(1) of Directive 2012/13, read in the light of Article 48(2) of the Charter, must be interpreted as precluding a person from being tried in absentia when, on account of inadequate interpretation, he or she has not been informed, in a language which he or she understands, of the accusation against him or her or where it is impossible to ascertain the quality of the interpretation provided and therefore to establish that he or she has been informed, in a language which he or she understands, of the accusation against him or her.

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138) In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first question is that:

– Article 5 of Directive 2010/64 must be interpreted as requiring Member States to take concrete measures in order to ensure that the quality of the interpretation and translations provided is sufficient to enable the suspect or accused person to understand the accusation against him or her and in order that that interpretation can be reviewed by the national courts;

– Article 2(5) of Directive 2010/64 and Article 4(5) and Article 6(1) of Directive 2012/13, read in the light of Article 48(2) of the Charter, must be interpreted as precluding a person from being tried in absentia when, on account of inadequate interpretation, he or she has not been informed, in a language which he or she understands, of the accusation against him or her or where it is impossible to ascertain the quality of the interpretation provided and therefore to establish that he or she has been informed, in a language which he or she understands, of the accusation against him or her.

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139) By his second question, the referring judge asks, in essence, whether the principle of judicial independence, enshrined in Article 19 TEU and Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as precluding the President of the NOJ from appointing the president of a court, by circumventing the applications procedure for judges and having recourse to direct temporary appointments, bearing in mind that the president of a court is empowered, inter alia, to decide on the allocation of cases, to commence disciplinary proceedings against judges and to assess judicial performance and, if the answer is in the affirmative, whether the proceedings before a court so presided over are fair. By his third question, the referring judge asks, in essence, whether the principle of judicial independence must be interpreted as precluding a remuneration system which provides that judges receive lower remuneration than prosecutors of the same category and allows discretionary bonuses to be awarded to judges and, if so, whether that principle must be interpreted as meaning that the right to a fair trial cannot be guaranteed in such circumstances.

140) Since the admissibility of those questions is disputed by the Hungarian Government and by the Commission on the ground, in essence, that neither the interpretation of Article 19 TEU nor that of Article 47 of the Charter is relevant for the purposes of resolving the dispute in the main proceedings, it should be recalled that, as is apparent from the actual wording of Article 267 TFEU, the question referred for a preliminary ruling must be ‘necessary’ to enable the referring court to ‘give judgment’ in the case before it (judgment of 26 March 2020, Miasto Łowicz and Prokurator Generalny, C‑558/18 and C‑563/18, EU:C:2020:234, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).

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144) First, as the Advocate General also observed in points 90 and 91 of his Opinion, the main proceedings do not concern the Hungarian judicial system as a whole, of which some aspects may undermine the independence of the judiciary and, more particularly, that of the referring court in its implementation of EU law. In that regard, the fact that there may be a material connection between the substance of the main proceedings and Article 47 of the Charter, if not more broadly with Article 19 TEU, is not sufficient to satisfy the criterion of necessity, referred to in Article 267 TFEU. In order to do so, it would be necessary for the interpretation of those provisions, as requested in the second and third questions, to be objectively required for the decision on the merits of the main proceedings, which is not the case here.

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148 Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the national court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.

On those grounds, the Court (Grand Chamber) hereby rules:

1. Article 267 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding the supreme court of a Member State from declaring, following an appeal in the interests of the law, that a request for a preliminary ruling which has been submitted to the Court under Article 267 TFEU by a lower court is unlawful on the ground that the questions referred are not relevant and necessary for the resolution of the dispute in the main proceedings, without, however, altering the legal effects of the decision containing that request. The principle of the primacy of EU law requires that lower court to disregard such a decision of the national supreme court.

2. Article 267 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding disciplinary proceedings from being brought against a national judge on the ground that he or she has made a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice under that provision.

3. Article 5 of Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings must be interpreted as requiring Member States to take concrete measures in order to ensure that the quality of the interpretation and translations provided is sufficient to enable the suspect or accused person to understand the accusation against him or her and in order that that interpretation can be reviewed by the national courts.

Article 2(5) of Directive 2010/64 and Article 4(5) and Article 6(1) of Directive 2012/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 on the right to information in criminal proceedings, read in the light of Article 48(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as precluding a person from being tried in absentia when, on account of inadequate interpretation, he or she has not been informed, in a language which he or she understands, of the accusation against him or her or where it is impossible to ascertain the quality of the interpretation provided and therefore to establish that he or she has been informed, in a language which he or she understands, of the accusation against him or her.