22) Because of Mr Sziber’s failure to amend his application, the Fővárosi Törvényszék (Budapest High Court) considered itself unable to rule on the substantive aspects of the remainder of the case. In accordance with Article 37 of Law DH2, examination of the case should have been discontinued. However, entertaining doubts as to the correct interpretation of some provisions of EU law and the compatibility of certain national rules with those provisions, that court decided, by order of 29 August 2016, to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling:

‘(1) Must the following provisions of EU law, namely, [Article 169 TFEU]; Article 38 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [(“the Charter”)] …; Article 7(1) and (2) of [Directive 93/13], read in the light of Article 8 of that directive and recital 47 of Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC, be interpreted as precluding rules of national law (and their application) that impose additional requirements prejudicial to a party to proceedings, whether applicant or defendant, who in the period from 1 May 2004 to 26 July 2014, has, in the capacity of a consumer, entered into a credit agreement containing an unfair contractual term allowing a unilateral increase in interest rates, costs or commissions or containing a bid-offer spread, on account of the fact that in accordance with those additional requirements, in order for the rights arising from the invalidity of those contracts concluded with consumers to be upheld before the courts and, in particular, in order for the court to be able to examine the substance of a case, a civil procedural document must be presented (primarily a claim, amendment of a claim or a plea of invalidity relied on by way of defence contesting the order against the consumer, amendment of that plea, a counterclaim by the defendant or amendment of that counterclaim) with certain mandatory content, whereas a party to proceedings who has not entered into a credit agreement or who in that period has, in the capacity of a consumer, entered into a credit agreement of a different kind from that described above, does not have to present such a document satisfying certain mandatory requirements as to content?

(2) Regardless of whether the Court of Justice answers Question 1, which is formulated in more general terms than this second question, in the affirmative or the negative, must the provisions of EU law listed in Question 1 be interpreted as precluding the following obligatory additional requirements [(a) to (c)] from applying to a party to proceedings who has, in the capacity of a consumer, entered into a credit agreement, as referred to in Question 1:

(a) in judicial proceedings, a claim, an amendment of a claim or a plea of invalidity relied upon by way of defence contesting the order against the consumer, amendment of that plea, a counterclaim by the defendant or an amendment of that counterclaim which must be presented by a party to proceedings, whether applicant or defendant, that has entered into a credit agreement, in the capacity of a consumer, as referred to in Question 1, will be admissible, that is to say, will be examined as to its substance, only if, in that document,

the party not only requests the court to declare invalid in whole or in part the consumer credit agreement referred to in Question 1, but also requests the court to apply the legal consequences associated with total invalidity,

whereas another party to proceedings who has not, in the capacity of a consumer, entered into a credit agreement or who in that period has, in the capacity of a consumer, entered into a credit agreement of a different kind from that described above, does not have to present such a document satisfying certain mandatory requirements as to content?

(b) in judicial proceedings, a claim, an amendment of a claim or a plea of invalidity relied upon by way of defence contesting the order against the consumer, amendment of that plea, a counterclaim by the defendant or amendment of that counterclaim that must be presented by a party to proceedings, whether applicant or defendant, who in the capacity of a consumer has entered into a credit agreement, as referred to in Question 1, will be admissible, that is to say, will be examined as to its substance, only if, in that document,

the applicant does not, in addition to seeking a declaration that the credit agreement entered into with consumers, as referred to in Question 1, is wholly invalid, request the court to apply, among legal consequences associated with total invalidity, that of judicially restoring the situation as it stood before the credit agreement was concluded,

whereas another party to proceedings who has not, in the capacity of a consumer, entered into a credit agreement or who in that period has, in the capacity of a consumer, entered into a credit agreement of a different kind from that described above, does not have to present such a document satisfying certain mandatory requirements as to content?

(c) in judicial proceedings, a claim, amendment of a claim or a plea of invalidity relied upon by way of defence contesting the order against the consumer, amendment of that plea, a counterclaim by the defendant or amendment of that counterclaim that must be presented by a party to proceedings, whether applicant or defendant, who has, in the capacity of a consumer, entered into a credit agreement, as referred to in Question 1, will be admissible, that is to say, will be examined as to its substance, only if that document includes,

for the period from the beginning of the contractual legal relationship to the date the application is lodged, a settlement calculation, extremely complex from the mathematical point of view (as prescribed by national provisions), that must be made also taking into account the rules regulating currency conversion into forints,

and that must include a detailed breakdown, arithmetically verifiable, indicating the payments due under the credit agreement, payments made by the applicant, the payments due leaving aside the void clause, and the difference between those figures; and specifying the grand total that the party who, in the capacity of a consumer, entered into the credit agreement, as referred to in Question 1, still owes the credit institution or paid in excess,

whereas another party to proceedings who has not, in the capacity of a consumer, entered into a credit agreement or who in that period has, in the capacity of a consumer, entered into a credit agreement of a different kind from that described above, does not have to present such a document satisfying certain mandatory requirements as to content?

(3) Must the provisions of EU law listed in Question 1 be interpreted as meaning that infringement of those rules by means of the imposition of the additional requirements listed in Questions 1 and 2 at the same time constitutes an infringement of Articles 20, 21 and 47 of [the Charter], taking into account likewise (in part in Questions 1 and 2 as well) that the courts of the Member States must apply EU law in the field of consumer protection even in cases without any cross-border elements, that is to say, in purely internal situations, in accordance with the judgments of the Court of Justice of 5 December 2000, Guimont, C‑448/98, EU:C:2000:663, paragraph 23, and of 10 May 2012, Duomo Gpa and Others, C‑357/10 to C‑359/10, EU:C:2012:283, paragraph 28, and the order of 3 July 2014, Tudoran, C‑92/14, EU:C:2014:2051, paragraph 39? Or must this be regarded as a cross-border situation merely because the credit agreements referred to in Question 1 are “foreign currency based credit agreements”?’

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28) To begin with, as concerns the interpretation of the Treaty provision on consumer protection — currently Article 169 TFEU — it must be pointed out that such a provision is mainly addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union. Without any explanation from the referring court as to why and how that provision may be applicable in a situation such as that of Mr Sziber, I do not believe that the Court is able to give a useful interpretation of it. Similarly, failing any elaboration on the part of the referring court concerning the relevance of Articles 20 (‘Equality before the law), 21 (‘Non-discrimination’), 38 (‘Consumer protection’) and 47 (‘Right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial’) of the Charter in the case at hand, the Court should in my view refrain from attempting to give a ruling on those provisions.