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To be effective, monitoring must be carried out by an entity sufficiently independent from the authority in charge of returns. In Germany and Sweden, monitors are part of the same entity responsible for parts of the return procedure, namely the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees in Germany and the Swedish Migration Agency. There is a lack of institutional separation, and thereby a lack of independence.
The Frontex pool of forced return monitors also raises independence concerns, as it is embedded in the enforcing authority. Although the pool has operational autonomy, a 2018 FRA publication (European Border and Coast Guard Regulation and its fundamental rights implications) proposed that it should be managed by an independent actor outside Frontex. The planned revision of the EBCG Regulation could be an opportunity to address this.
Those EU Member States that have appointed National Preventive Mechanisms as the body in charge of forced return monitoring offer the strongest guarantees of independence. They may, however, face other challenges, such as limited resources (see also FRA’s 2020 report: Strong and effective national human rights institutions – challenges, promising practices and opportunities). For the monitoring systems under the Pact on Asylum and Migration, Article 10 of the screening regulation requires the participation of national statutory human rights bodies, such as Ombuds institutions.
The publication of findings from monitoring activities is a key aspect of effective monitoring. Most oversight bodies publish at least a summary of their observations with recommendations related to the monitoring of returns. This is usually part of their annual reports.
Leaving aside the Member States where no monitoring occurred in 2024, there are no public reports on findings from Austria, the German federal level monitoring system, Hungary, Luxembourg, Malta, Romania, Sweden or Slovenia. Monitoring bodies indicated that reports are available upon request in Malta (to the parliament), Romania, Slovenia and Sweden. Promising practices were observed in Estonia, Portugal and Slovakia, which published summaries of the individual return operations monitored.
An overview of the work of the Frontex pool of forced return monitors is available in chapter 2 of the 2024 Annual Report of the Frontex Fundamental Rights Officer. It contains monitoring statistics, findings and recommendations.
To be effective, monitoring must have a certain regularity. It must also cover all types of forced return operations, as well as its different phases. In certain situations, EU law requires monitoring of all operations. Specifically, Article 50 (3) of the EBCG Regulation requires this for all Frontex-supported operations where transport and escorts are provided by the country of return. These are cases of so called ‘collecting return operations’.
In Spain, France, Croatia, Italy and Poland no return operations were monitored in 2024. However, Eurostat data show that 8 725 individuals were forcibly returned from Spain, 14 685 from France, 6 685 from Croatia, 4 480 from Italy and 8 520 from Poland in 2024. In Croatia there has been a monitoring gap since 2021. In Austria, Czechia, Greece, Lithuania, Latvia, Luxembourg and Slovenia less than 10 return operations were monitored per country in 2024. This was also the case for the German federal mechanism, although there were civil society organisations that monitored the pre-return phase in some airports.
In at least six EU Member States (Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, and Slovenia) monitors focused on pre-return activities. This means that monitors observed the pick-up of returnees, their transfer to the airport, and procedures before and during embarkation. They were, however, rarely present during the return flight itself and did not observe the handover to the authorities of the country of return.
There are several reasons why in some countries, monitoring efforts focus primarily on the pre-return phase. A primary factor is that risk assessments recognise this initial stage as involving multiple fundamental rights concerns. Other considerations, such as limited human and financial also play a role. While FRA endorses prioritising monitoring based on risk analysis, it stresses the importance of periodically observing all phases of the return process. Failing to do so could undermine the overall effectiveness of the forced return monitoring system.
Across the EU in 2024, FRA counted 26 instances of Member States monitoring forced return operations implemented through charter flights. This shows a 50% decrease vis- à -vis 2023. Monitoring of return operations by commercial flights amounted to 763, an increase as compared to a little under 600 operations monitored in 2023. This trend reflects the overall rise in number of returns by commercial flights. 20 EU Member States monitored forced return operations by commercial flights in 2024.
Return operations via land transport were monitored in Belgium, Czechia, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia. In 2024, 46 land operations were monitored, marking an increase from 36 operations monitored in 2023. No Member State indicated having monitored return operations by sea.
Past FRA updates have shown that the in-flight phase of returns generally entails a lower risk level when conducted via commercial flights compared with charter flights. This is in large part due to the public visibility and the profile of returnees. Still, distinct challenges may arise during the preparatory phase, particularly in instances involving the removal of families or individuals with medical conditions.
FRA inquired about information provided by the authorities on upcoming return operations. The agency examined whether it is timely and sufficient to allow adequate planning of forced return monitoring activities. Most Member States express that the information provided by the authorities is timely and enables effective planning of monitoring. Still, issues with the timely provision of information emerged in the following Member States: Bulgaria, Czechia, Finland, Germany (for airport monitoring by civil society organisations), Lithuania Greece, and Spain. Some monitoring bodies have indicated that while Frontex provides timely notification of their return operations, the national authorities do not necessarily do so. Even when information on the dates of operations is passed in a prompt fashion, information on vulnerabilities may not be provided or only at short notice upon request.
A recurrent issue is the lack of capacity of national monitors in terms of human resources and funding. In some Member States, this is showcased by the low number of operations monitored during the in-flight and hand-over phases.
Monitoring mechanisms in Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Portugal, Greece, Lithuania, Romania and Slovenia are either fully or partly funded through Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) funds. These situations, in particular, may give rise to monitoring gaps. One such lapse occurred in the first half of 2024 in Lithuania and Slovenia and in the second half of 2024 in Greece, due to the phasing out of AMIF.
Apart from AMIF-related funding obstacles, monitoring entities in Czechia, Finland, Latvia and Poland reported financial and human resources challenges. Airport monitoring by civil society organisations in Germany also faced such obstacles to conduct monitoring activities effectively.
The lack of sustainable funding and/or dependency on AMIF funding appears to be one of the main obstacles to effective monitoring. To ensure sustainability in monitoring, mandated bodies should be equipped with sufficient financial and human resources.