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17
November
2025

Regulating online terrorist content – Balancing public safety and fundamental rights

Online terrorist content is a threat to fundamental rights, rule of law and democracy. EU measures to tackle such content aim to prevent terrorism while upholding these values. FRA’s report looks at how online terrorist content is detected and removed under EU legislation. It highlights challenges in interpreting rules, risks of over-removal and potential impacts on freedom of expression. It finds that moderation practices by authorities and platforms can disproportionately affect certain groups, such as Muslims and Arabic speakers, while far-right content often receives less scrutiny. The findings, based on research and expert interviews with those addressing online terrorist content, offer ways to improve transparency in content moderation and to better balance public security and fundamental rights, contributing to wider debates on regulating online content responsibly.

By greatly facilitating the dissemination of information and ideas, the online environment amplifies freedom of expression and the enjoyment of numerous other rights. At the same time, it can be abused to spread various types of illegal content. Material promoting terrorism and terrorist groups – ranging from footage of terrorist attacks and manifestoes of their perpetrators going viral to websites of terrorist organisations hosting troves of propaganda material – poses a particular risk in this regard. The 2019 Christchurch terrorist attack, which was internationally streamed on social media platforms and has inspired numerous other attackers since, is a case in point.

Regulation (EU) 2021/784 on addressing the dissemination of terrorist content online (the regulation) was adopted to complement voluntary cooperation mechanisms between the EU, national authorities and companies providing online hosting services. To this end, it provides authorities with enforceable tools, notably the possibility to order such hosting service providers (HSPs) to expeditiously remove content considered to be terrorist content and to implement measures to protect their platforms against the proliferation of such content. As sectoral legislation dedicated exclusively to tackling terrorist content, the regulation complements the EU Digital Services Act (DSA), which covers illegal content more broadly.

The regulation entrusts both national authorities and HSPs with significant responsibilities aimed at reducing the proliferation of terrorist content while requiring them to ensure respect for the freedom of expression and information and other fundamental rights. When it was proposed, its impact on rights was among the key issues discussed. Upon a request of the European Parliament, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) issued a legal opinion on the legislative proposal, identifying risks to fundamental rights and suggesting additional safeguards [1]
 FRA, Proposal for a regulation on preventing the dissemination of terrorist content online and its fundamental rights implications – Opinion of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2019.
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In accordance with Article 23 of the regulation, the European Commission should carry out an evaluation of the regulation and, where appropriate, accompany it with legislative proposals. This assessment, scheduled for 2026, should also cover the impact of its application on fundamental rights, in particular on freedom of expression and information, the respect for private life and the protection of personal data, and the functioning of the safeguards present in the regulation. To support this evaluation, the Commission requested that FRA conduct research on the impact of the regulation on fundamental rights.

Informed by the experience of practitioners and other experts in the field, the findings and opinions deriving from this research aim to support EU institutions and EU Member States in implementing legislation, policy and other measures in the area of addressing online terrorist content in full compliance with fundamental rights obligations and help them assess the need for further action in this area.

At the international level, none of the United Nations (UN) or Council of Europe conventions addressing terrorism focus on online terrorist content or set out standards for its removal. The UN Security Council has urged states to take action to address this phenomenon through a number of its resolutions, emphasising the need to work together with the private sector and civil society to develop and implement effective means to counter the use of the internet for terrorist purposes, while respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms [2]
 For example, UN Security Council Resolutions 1963 (2010), 2129 (2013), 2170 (2014), 2178 (2014), 2253 (2015), 2322 (2016), 2354 (2017), 2395 (2017), 2396 (2017) and 2617 (2021).
. At the Council of Europe level, the 2018 ‘Guidelines for States on actions to be taken vis-à-vis internet intermediaries with due regard to their roles and responsibilities’ recommends which principles should be followed when companies block or remove content, both as a result of their own moderation policies and when ordered to do so by state authorities [3]
 Council of Europe, Appendix to Recommendation CM/Rec(2018)2 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the roles and responsibilities of internet intermediaries, 7 March 2018.
. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has a rich body of jurisprudence applicable to combating terrorist content online and the impact on human rights enshrined under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (see Section ‘Addressing terrorist content online and fundamental rights’).

In the absence of international treaties specifically addressing the issue, action against terrorist content online has focused on cooperation between international organisations, governments and the online industry. Since 2016, the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) and national governments have been funding Tech Against Terrorism [4]
 See Tech Against Terrorismwebsite.
, an initiative supporting companies and authorities in addressing terrorist activity online. In 2019, a group of HSPs launched the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT) [5]
 See Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism website.
that promotes technical collaboration, conducts research and shares promising practices. Following the Christchurch terrorist attack, France and New Zealand launched the Christchurch Call, a global initiative bringing together governments, civil society and the private sector to combat terrorist content online [6]
 See The Christchurch Call website.
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At the EU level, Directive (EU) 2017/541 on combating terrorism [7]
 Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA, OJ L 88, 31.3.2017, p. 6, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2017/541/oj.
establishes minimum EU rules and provides for a harmonised definition of terrorist offences. It criminalises a range of offences that can take place online. This notably includes public provocation to commit terrorist offences, which explicitly covers both online and offline dimensions and requires the presence of a terrorist intent of the accused and a danger that a terrorist act may be carried out as a result. As part of its research to support its evaluation by the Commission, FRA looked into the fundamental rights impact of Directive (EU) 2017/541. It recommended, among other things, to enhance the foreseeability and clarity of the offences and apply them only to conduct that is of actual terrorist nature and avoid discriminatory impact of the legislation on specific groups in society [8]
 FRA, Directive (EU) 2017/541 on Combating Terrorism – Impact on fundamental rights and freedoms, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2021.
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Directive (EU) 2017/541 also obliges Member States to have in place measures for the prompt removal of online content hosted in their territory that constitutes such public provocation. Member States therefore had the possibility to the order removal of online terrorist content prior to the adoption of the regulation, but typically limited it to takedowns during criminal proceedings, with the involvement of a judge or prosecutor.

Outside this criminal law framework, the EU’s response to terrorist content online was initially based on voluntary cooperation with the online industry. In 2015, the EU Internet Forum was set up, bringing together EU institutions, Member States, tech companies and other stakeholders to address challenges posed by online terrorist content and to develop guidance for companies. Among other actions, this resulted in developing the EU Crisis Protocol, a rapid response mechanism to tackle the viral spread of terrorist and other violent extremist content. Other initiatives were taken in the broader context of countering online hate speech, notably the EU Code of Conduct agreed with major platforms in 2016 [9]
 Its revised version, ‘Code of conduct on countering illegal hate speech online+’, was integrated into the framework of the DSA in 2025.
. In 2018, the Commission issued a recommendation on measures to effectively tackle illegal content online [10]
 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2018/334 of 1 March 2018 on measures to effectively tackle illegal content online, OJ L 63, 6.3.2018, p. 50, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2018/334/oj.
, followed by the proposed regulation.

The regulation applies alongside other legislation dealing with online content and impacting HSP moderation policies. Notably, the DSA establishes harmonised rules preventing illegal and harmful activities online, also encompassing terrorist content [11]
 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a single market for digital services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj.
. The Audiovisual Media Services Directive [12]
 Consolidated text: Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive), ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2010/13/2025-02-08, Article 28b(1)(c).
, as amended by the Media Freedom Act [13]
 Regulation (EU) 2024/1083 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market and amending Directive 2010/13/EU (European Media Freedom Act), OJ L 2024/1083, 17.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1083/oj.
, requires Member States to ensure that video-sharing platforms do not disseminate content inciting terrorism.

The regulation sends out a clear message. […] With other types of content, maybe you can be more lenient, but when it comes to terrorist content, there is no room for it online. It has become a priority. […] As much as all harmful content is bad, there are levels to it, and the terrorist threat that we have in Europe now has to be taken seriously.

Civil-society/academia expert

The European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) plays a particular role in addressing terrorist content online and supporting Member State authorities in this field. The EU Internet Referral Unit was established at Europol’s European Counter-Terrorism Centre in 2015 with the task of detecting and investigating malicious online content and has been active in sending HSPs referrals, which flag suspected terrorist content on companies’ platforms for their own review [14]
 Europol, ‘EU Internet Referral Unit – EU IRU’, Europol website.
. In July 2023, it launched the EU Platform on Illicit Content Online (PERCI) to support Member States in applying the regulation. Notably, it allows transmitting removal orders and referrals, supports the scrutiny of cross-border removal orders and facilitates deconfliction (avoiding that a removal of content by one Member State would interfere with investigations in other Member States).

The proliferation of terrorist content online seeking to radicalise and recruit individuals and to facilitate and direct terrorist activities poses significant risks to public safety and security and can impact a variety of fundamental rights guaranteed by the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights (the Charter). These range from the right to life (Article 2) to freedom of expression and information (Article 11) of the broader online community, and the rights of victims of past terrorist attacks. Such content is increasingly aimed at children and young adults and can have a particularly harmful impact on them, affecting the rights of the child (Article 24) [15]
 See, for example, Europol, European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report – 2024, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2024.
. By addressing this phenomenon, the regulation helps protect these rights and interests.

At the same time, as with any counterterrorism measure, regulating online content gives rise to fundamental rights challenges. The regulation recognises its impact on specific rights. Article 1(4) emphasises freedom of expression and information, including freedom and pluralism of the media, while the preamble highlights the need to also safeguard the right to respect for private life, the protection of personal data, freedom to conduct a business, the prohibition of discrimination and the right to an effective remedy (Recitals 3 and 10). The need for any interference with rights to observe the principles of necessity and proportionality is recognised. The regulation also provides for particular protection of material disseminated for educational, journalistic, artistic and research purposes, along with material aimed at raising awareness against terrorism, and underlines that radical, polemic or controversial views expressed in public debate should not be equated with terrorism (Article 1(3) and Recital 12). In the context of the requirement to evaluate the regulation (Article 23), the prominent place given to the impact on fundamental rights and on the functioning and effectiveness of safeguards should testify to the importance that the EU legislator attaches to this matter.

ECtHR jurisprudence on the freedom of expression is of particular relevance when analysing the interplay between combating terrorist content online and human rights [16]
 On this topic, see also ECtHR Press Unit, ‘Terrorism and the European Convention on Human Rights – Factsheet’, February 2024; and Council of Europe and ECtHR, ‘Guide on Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights – Freedom of expression’, 31 August 2022.
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According to the ECtHR, the right to freedom of expression pursuant to Article 10 of the ECHR (equivalent to Article 11 of the Charter) constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society [17]
 Judgment of the Court of the ECtHR of 7 December 1976, Handyside v the United Kingdom, No 5493/72, paragraph 49.
. The ECtHR held repeatedly that its protection extends to forms of expression less favourably received or those that even offend, shock or disturb [18]
 Judgment of the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR of 15 May 2023,Sanchez v France, No 45581/15, paragraph 151; judgment of the Court of the ECtHR of 26 November 1991, Observer and Guardian v the United Kingdom, No 13585/88, paragraph 59.
. Furthermore, freedom of expression includes positive obligations, implying that states must establish effective mechanisms protecting content providers to create a favourable environment for participation in public debate, enabling them to express their opinions and ideas even if they counter official authorities or public opinion [19]
 Judgment of the Second Section of the ECtHR of 14 December 2010, Dink v Turkey, Nos 2668/07, 6102/08, 30079/08, 7072/09 and 7124/09, paragraph 137; judgment of the Fifth Section of the ECtHR of 10 April 2019, Khadija Ismayilova v Azerbaijan, Nos 65286/13 and 57270/14, paragraph 158.
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The ECtHR has recognised that the objective of the fight against terrorism represents a legitimate limitation to freedom of expression and that clear incitement of violence and support for terrorist activities does not enjoy the protection afforded by Article 10 of the ECHR [20]
 For example, judgment of the Fifth Section of the ECtHR of 6 April 2009, Leroy v France, No 36109/03, paragraph 36.
. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has likewise indicated that the fight against terrorism may, in certain cases, restrict fundamental rights due to its legitimate aim of protecting national security [21]
 Judgment of the Grand Chamber of 3 September 2008, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, ECLI:EU:C:2008:461, paragraph 363; judgment of the Third Chamber of 15 November 2012, Al-Aqsa v Council and Pays-Bas / Al-Aqsa, C-539/10 P, ECLI:EU:C:2012:711, paragraph 130; judgment of the Grand Chamber of 8 April 2014, Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others, C-293/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:238, paragraph 42.
. However, while restrictions on idealising, condoning or commenting positively on terrorist crimes and terrorists are in principle justified, the definition of terrorist content may only cover forms of expression that manifestly incite, glorify or justify violence, hatred or other forms of intolerance relating to terrorist activities, going beyond a mere expression of sympathy [22]
 Judgment of the Third Section of the ECtHR of 8 October 2018, Stomakhin v Russia, No 52273/07, paragraphs 89, 99–107; judgment of the Fifth Section of the ECtHR of 12 November 2015, Bidart v France, No 52363/11, paragraphs 42–43; decision of the Second Section of the ECtHR of 17 April 2018, Roj TV A/S v Denmark, No 24683/14, paragraphs 46–48; decision of the Fifth Section of the ECtHR of 12 June 2012, Hizb Ut-Tahrir and Others v Germany, No 31098/08, paragraphs 73–74 and 78.
. Politically sensitive statements that nevertheless do not advocate violence may form part of a debate of general interest, protected by Article 10 of the ECHR [23]
 Judgment of the Third Section of the ECtHR of 22 September 2021, Erkizia Almandoz v Spain, No 5869/17, paragraphs 40–41.
. Furthermore, when classifying speech as inciting violence or defending terrorism, the ECtHR found that the determination must focus on the content and the context of the publication, their potential impact and the personality and function of the person making the statements [24]
 Judgment of the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR of 8 July 1999, Erdoğdu and İnce v Turkey, Nos 25067/94 and 25068/94, paragraph 47; judgment of the Third Section of the ECtHR of 12 July 2007, Demirel and Ateş v Turkey, Nos 10037/03 and 14813/03, paragraph 37; judgment of the Fourth Section of the ECtHR of 16 March 2000, Özgür Gündem v Turkey, No 23144/93, paragraph 63; judgment of the Second Section of the ECtHR of 6 October 2010, Gözel and Özer v Turkey, Nos 43453/04 and 31098/05, paragraph 52; judgment of the Third Section of the ECtHR of 8 October 2018, Stomakhin v Russia, No 52273/07, paragraphs 93 and 131; judgment of the Fifth Section of the ECtHR of 12 November 2015, Bidart v France, No 52363/11, paragraphs 35 and 45; decision of the Fifth Section of the ECtHR of 20 October 2015, M’Bala M’Bala v France, No 25239/13, paragraphs 37–39.
. It has acknowledged the important role that the internet plays in the exercise of freedom of expression by facilitating the dissemination of information and access by the public, while recognising that it has the potential to exacerbate the impact of illegal speech [25]
 Judgment of the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR of 16 June 2015, Delfi AS v Estonia, No 64569/09, paragraphs 110 and 133; judgment of the Fourth Section of the ECtHR of 10 June 2009, Times Newspapers Ltd (Nos 1 and 2) v the United Kingdom, Nos 3002/03 and 23676/03, paragraph 27.
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The ECtHR has clarified that Article 10 permits only restrictions that are necessary and proportionate ‘within a democratic society’ and are clearly prescribed by law, which includes their accessibility and foreseeability [26]
 Judgment of the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR of 22 December 2020, Selahattin Demirtaş v Turkey (No 2), No 14305/17, paragraphs 249–254 and 270; judgment of the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR of 15 October 2015, Perinçek v Switzerland, No 27510/08, paragraph 131.
. When states take measures affecting fundamental rights, the law must indicate the scope of any discretion conferred on the authorities and the manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity, giving the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference [27]
 Judgment of the Fourth Section of the ECtHR of 6 June 2016, Szabo and Vissy v Hungary, No 37138/14, paragraphs 59 and 65.
. The ECtHR has also repeatedly emphasised the importance of judicial intervention in cases related to limitations of freedom of expression to provide a genuine safeguard against abuse, underlining that judicial review of limitations which only takes place ex post and upon application might not provide a sufficient guarantee against abuse [28]
 Judgment of the Fifth Section of the ECtHR of 12 November 2015, Bidart v France, No 52363/11, paragraphs 38–41; judgment of the Third Section of the ECtHR of 17 October 2001, Association Ekin v France, No 39288/98, paragraph 61.
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The jurisprudence illustrates the challenges of regulating this area in a manner which is both effective and complies with fundamental rights. Indeed, the draft regulation proposed by the Commission in 2018 [29]
 Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on preventing the dissemination of terrorist content online – A contribution from the European Commission to the Leaders’ meeting in Salzburg on 19–20 September 2018, COM(2018) 640 final of 12 September 2018, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52018PC0640.
attracted considerable scrutiny and concerns over its impact on a range of fundamental rights by national and EU stakeholders, international human rights bodies, civil-society organisations, professional associations, academics and HSPs. This resulted in significant changes to the text and the insertion of additional safeguards. Some of these sources and the concerns identified by them are referenced throughout the report as they appear to remain relevant in light of the findings on the practical application of the regulation.

This report is primarily based on data collected through fieldwork involving interviews with 62 practitioners and other experts, representing three broad professional categories: staff of competent authorities applying the regulation, staff of HSPs and experts from civil society and academia. The annex provides further details on the composition of the respondent groups, the methodology of the interviews and the manner in which the respondents and the insights they shared are referred to throughout the report.

The fieldwork was supplemented by limited desk research. In addition, Europol (the EU Internet Referral Unit of the European Counter-Terrorism Centre) provided FRA with information on the functioning and use of PERCI.

The main aim of the research was to analyse the impact of the application of the regulation on fundamental rights and freedoms safeguarded by the Charter. The report builds upon and complements FRA’s prior work on terrorism. In comparison with FRA’s 2019 legal opinion on the proposed regulation, which provided a legal analysis of the draft text, the current report focuses on the practical insights of practitioners and experts applying the regulation. This allows for the comparison of the concerns raised during the discussions on the proposal with actual application in practice.

The 2021 FRA report on Directive (EU) 2017/541, which looked at the impact on fundamental rights and freedoms of the main EU criminal law instrument in the field of counterterrorism, is likewise relevant as the regulation relies on this legal instrument when defining some of its core concepts, most notably the definition of terrorist content online, which is at the heart of some of the application challenges identified by the research.

The regulation provides new tools for the removal of online terrorist content that may present new challenges and implications for the practical exercise of fundamental rights. The research particularly concentrates on the impact its provisions may have on freedom of expression and information; the right to private and family life; freedom of thought, conscience and religion; freedom of assembly and association; freedom of the arts and sciences; freedom to conduct a business; prohibition of discrimination; and the right to an effective remedy.

While Article 23 of the regulation specifically mentions the need to evaluate the impact on the protection of personal data, FRA’s research collected limited information in this respect. This is largely due to the limited number of HSPs that agreed to participate in the research (see textbox ‘Coverage of HSP experience’) and could share relevant insights as regards the application of the obligation to preserve removed content pursuant to Article 6 of the regulation, one of the most relevant provisions with regard to this right. Therefore, while this report recognises the impact of the regulation on the protection of personal data, it does not further examine it.

The findings of the research need to be considered in the context of the state of application of the regulation. While the regulation became applicable in June 2022, its uptake by Member States was gradual and uneven in terms of designating the competent authorities and making use of removal orders, the first of which were issued in 2023 [30]
 In January 2023, the Commission launched infringement proceedings against 22 Member States for not having designated competent authorities under Article 12(1) and failure to comply with other obligations under the regulation. See Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation of Regulation (EU) 2021/784 on addressing the dissemination of terrorist content online, COM(2024) 64 final of 14 February 2024, p. 2, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2024%3A64%3AFIN.
. Therefore, at the time when the fieldwork was carried out in the second half of 2024, only some competent authorities and HSPs had practical experience in applying the regulation and could share meaningful insights. Furthermore, very limited to no experience could be collected with respect to some elements of the regulation that would be necessary for a proper assessment of its impact on fundamental rights, namely specific measures, scrutiny of cross-border removal orders, penalties and, in particular, remedies. While specific measures, scrutiny and remedies are covered by this report, to the extent possible, the role of penalties is not explored given this lack of information. Despite the described limitations, interviewees provided FRA with rich information and practical insights, beyond specific fundamental rights implications, which permitted FRA to build a comprehensive framework to conduct research and analysis, and allowed for the contextualisation of the fieldwork findings.

  • Chapter 1 introduces fundamental rights challenges arising in relation to the definitions used by the regulation, in particular the clarity and scope of the definition of online terrorist content.
  • Chapter 2 presents the impact on fundamental rights of the main instruments used by competent authorities to address terrorist content online – namely, the newly introduced removal orders under the regulation, alongside the pre-existing referrals, which are variously used by authorities to flag content to HSPs for their own assessment.
  • Chapter 3 looks at fundamental rights issues emerging from HSPs’ own content moderation efforts and their interplay with the regulation, including in the context of the obligation to implement specific measures such as employing automated detection tools.
  • Chapter 4 addresses the effectiveness of the scrutiny of cross-border removal orders and of judicial remedies, two key safeguards under the regulation.